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Abstract
This paper provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive
for religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana
into a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between them-
selves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members
enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own church compared to members
that only receive information about the insurance. Enrollment also reduces giving towards other
spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance.
The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherents
perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an
interventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church community
is also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel.
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1 Introduction
Do religious believers give money to their churches in the hope of receiving insurance against economic
shocks? And if so, to what extent is this because they expect the church to look after them when
shocks occur, and to what extent do they expect God to look after them by making such shocks
less likely to happen? Many studies have emphasized the important economic functions that religious
institutions fulfil across the world, of which the provision of informal insurance is one that has recently
gained attention (Chen, 2010; Ager and Ciccone, 2016). Such insurance is likely to be particularly
important in settings with weak formal institutions and where individuals are exposed to a variety of
uninsured risks. In this paper we report a study examining the effect of providing formal market-based
insurance on the demand for informal church-based insurance in Accra, Ghana.
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with members of a Pentecostal church in Accra to test
whether insurance is one motive behind religious participation. We do not claim it is the only or even
the most important motive. We perform our experiment by randomly assigning free enrollment into
a formal, commercially available funeral insurance policy and measuring how this affects willingness
to contribute money in a dictator game to the church and two other charitable recipients.
The additional recipients - a secular charity and a nationwide prayer event - provide a means of
differentiating between two possible mechanisms by which members might expect insurance to work.
The first mechanism, consistent with a club good interpretation of church involvement, is one in which
the church provides financial support to those who suffer economic hardship provided they have pre-
viously given money to the church. The second mechanism is one in which members expect God
to intervene to reduce the risk of adverse economic shocks provided the individuals concerned have
demonstrated spiritually meritorious actions.1 Giving money to a secular charity or to a nationwide
prayer event might be considered meritorious actions but they do not involve a contribution to the
church.
Urban Ghana is a particularly interesting setting in which to study interactions between religious
participation and insurance. First of all, as we describe below, Pentecostalist churches are massively
1Strictly speaking, this mechanism is not insurance but a preventive measure to decrease the (subjective) likelihood
of an economic shock. We use “insurance mechanism” and “insurance motive” broadly to encompass insurance contracts
as well as risk-preventive or risk-mitigating behavior.
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present in Ghana and many members of the population give very significant shares of their income
to their church. This setting therefore allows us to examine the motives for costly participation in
activities that are also present in many other countries in the world. In our model we envisage two
broad motives for participation - both the consumption of spiritual activities as such and the purchase
of insurance against various shocks, and our survey evidence indicates that both of these motives mat-
ter. Secondly, in our main sample of church members we find that approximately 15% indicate that
they hold any insurance other than the government run National Health Insurance. Relatively low
rates of insurance mean that enrollment in a formal policy is likely to be a meaningful and significant
treatment for many of our participants. Overall, therefore, our results are likely to be relevant for
other settings characterized by low penetration of formal insurance and the importance of religious
institutions, including different Sub-Saharan African countries but also other parts of the world such
as Latin America.
We find that enrollment in the formal insurance policy causes church members to give less money
to the church in a dictator game, compared to members that only receive information about the in-
surance. Interestingly, we find that formal insurance also causes church members to give less to the
other recipients who are not directly linked to the church, but are associated with church teachings
on meritorious actions.
We set up a simple model to illustrate the conditions under which we can interpret these results
as evidence for insurance. In the model, a church member derives utility from secular and religious
consumption. We first show that if religious consumption does not have an insurance motivation, a
reduction in perceived losses (through our enrolment treatment) should increase the amount allocated
to religious consumption, via an income effect. However, if religious consumption does have an insur-
ance motivation, and if the insurance is perceived as sufficiently effective, the substitution effect of a
reduction in perceived losses will outweigh the income effect and lead to a reduction in the amount
allocated to religious consumption. This is what we find in our experiment.
This insurance motive can work either through a reduction in perceived losses from negative shocks
because of transfers from other church members or from the church organisation, or through a re-
duction in perceived probabilities of adverse shocks because of belief in a divine response to religious
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giving. Our experiment finds evidence for the latter mechanism: church members change donations
to the church as well as to the non-church recipients in a manner that is consistent with interpreting
giving as a demand for divine protection. Church members can see their donations to the church
as a way to mitigate the risks they face. Provision of formal insurance decreases the need for using
donations as risk-coping mechanism.
We undertook our experiment in two waves, the first in 2015 and the second in 2019. We im-
plemented the second wave to verify the robustness of a heterogeneous treatment effect that can be
explained by our model but which we had not expected to encounter in the field and which we had
not pre-registered. If there are differences in the degree of religiosity, either between individuals or
for a given individual over time, our model predicts that the income effect outweighs the substitution
effect for sufficiently high values of the religiosity parameter.
This is what we found for a subset of subjects in the first wave who had been involved in what are
called “revival weeks”, which are particularly intense periods of church-going and fund-raising during
which congregations typically give substantially more to the church than normal. The treatment ef-
fect was of the opposite sign during revival weeks to its sign in normal weeks. This phenomenon was
reproduced in a pre-registered experiment in our second wave. In a direct replication of the original
experiment on participants not in revival weeks, the original effect was also reproduced.2
As the process of explaining to subjects the nature of the insurance in which we proposed to enrol
them could increase the salience of the insured risk, our control group consisted of subjects to whom
we explained the insurance but who were not enrolled. In order to assess this potential salience effect,
we added a treatment in which subjects were not informed about the content of the insurance. In our
first wave, the fact of explaining the insurance without enrolling the subjects resulted in a higher level
of donations to the church, suggesting a significant salience impact in the opposite direction to our
main treatment effect. This finding is interesting since many of the churches’ communications place a
heavy emphasis on the ever-present risk of death, and it could be argued that the churches are aware
of this link and use it to increase overall donations. In the second wave, we did not replicate this
finding; this contrasts with our insurance treatment effect, which was indeed replicated.
2The second wave experiment on revival week participants was not strictly speaking a replication since we sought to
randomize allocation to revival weeks in a way that had not been done in the first wave.
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Although our model is an instance of standard micro-economic analysis as applied to the allocation
of resources between secular and religious consumption, our empirical study is methodologically in-
novative in two main ways. First, we have provided an experimental intervention that directly affects
the demand for religious insurance by providing an institutional substitute. Secondly, we have sought
to distinguish carefully between different channels through which religious insurance might work -
notably, through influencing the behavior of other members of the religious community as opposed to
influencing the probabilities of adverse events themselves that are believed by subjects to be deter-
mined by God.
Our study experimentally links the religious practice of church giving to an insurance motive, and
we find evidence that subjects believe their donations can induce God to intervene causally in the
world. A Pentecostal church is a particularly good setting to test this because participation costs and
expected outcomes are made explicit, and “giving to God” has a clear doctrinal mandate.
1.1 Link with the literature
The macro-economic literature, in the wake of Weber (1905), has long recognized the potential im-
portance of culture, and especially religion, for economic growth. However, most empirical studies
in this literature face a challenge in surmounting endogeneity problems, and it is generally hard to
rule out the possibility that confounding factors explain both the religiosity of a population and the
growth of its economy. For instance McCleary and Barro (2006a) find in their instrumental variable
model that higher GDP per capita causes a reduction in average religiosity. They also find that the
relationship between economic development and religiosity depends on the particular dimension of
development. For example, education has different effects from those of urbanization (McCleary and
Barro, 2006b). Thus, even when it is possible to estimate the magnitude of aggregate causal effects,
such large-scale studies have difficulty pinpointing the mechanisms involved. Experimental methods
are therefore helpful both in establishing causality and in identifying the likely mechanisms. Our paper
aims at understanding a specific economic function of religious organizations: their role as informal
insurers.
5
In examining religious organisations as insurers, our work follows that of Chen (2010), who finds
that religious intensity increased with the need for ex-post insurance after financial shocks in Indone-
sia. Ager and Ciccone (2016) find a relationship between higher rainfall risk and religious participation
and Sinding Bentzen (2019) finds that religiosity increases if an earthquake has recently struck close
by. However, each study is compatible with a number of possible causal mechanisms, which our
experiment is designed to elucidate. In particular, while the findings of Chen (2010) suggest an insur-
ance motive for religious participation, they are also compatible with other explanations for religious
participation, such as that religion provides comfort in distress after shocks strike. The findings of
Ager and Ciccone (2016) and Sinding Bentzen (2019) are compatible with interpretations where other
characteristics associated with rainfall or earthquake risk are also the proximate cause of religious
membership (such as the amount and type of education). Our experiment allows us to allocate insur-
ance randomly to subjects to test the insurance mechanisms more directly.
In other studies, religious participation has also been shown to provide partial insurance against
fluctuations in consumption and well being (Dehejia et al., 2007). Other evidence from cross-country
surveys, and historical evidence from the Great Depression demonstrate a degree of substitution be-
tween access to social welfare and religious participation (Gruber and Hungerman, 2007; Scheve and
Stasavage, 2006). We add experimental evidence to this literature, causally demonstrating that access
to secular insurance can reduce religious involvement. More importantly, the experimental approach
allows us to test for the mechanism at hand and therefore acts as a complement to previous research
done with observational data.
Our finding that spiritual insurance is an economically important reaction to risk of those who are
not formally insured has important implications for the interpretation of the previously mentioned
studies. Indeed, the previous literature on the interplay between religion and insurance is not able
to distinguish between those two channels and might overstate the role of religious institutions as
a provider of community-based financial insurance and understate the importance of a spiritual or
psychological response to risk that is reflected in increased religiosity. This problem of identification
is vindicated by some recent studies showing that beliefs in divine intervention in the daily lives of
individuals can be an important determinant of real and costly social decisions (see Hadnes and Schu-
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macher, 2012; Gershman, 2016; Nunn and de la Sierra, 2017).3
Our experiment contributes to the microinsurance literature by studying in a controlled environ-
ment how religious participation might affect demand for formal insurance. In recent years, microin-
surance policies have been proposed and tested as poverty alleviation tools with limited success (Cole
et al., 2013; Giesbert et al., 2011; Giesbert and Steiner, 2015; Karlan et al., 2014). Consistently across
studies, take-up has been lower than expected and this has been attributed to a variety of factors
including liquidity constraints (Cole et al., 2013), limited attention (Zwane et al., 2011), trust in the
insurance mechanism (Karlan et al., 2014), and the existence of informal insurance substitutes (Mo-
barak and Rosenzweig, 2013). Our results suggest that religious institutions, which are an important
instance of informal networks in developing countries, already provide global spiritual insurance to
their members (although we do not claim that this is the only motive for church participation), and
this may partly explain the puzzle of the limited success of specific formal insurance in some contexts.
Since our survey results suggest that churches are also important sources of financial assistance to
their members, we hypothesize that an informal, community-based material insurance exists in par-
allel, reducing further the need for formal insurance.
In the following section, we describe the religious context of our study. In section 3, we present
the experimental design. In section 4, we use a simple model to derive our experimental hypotheses
to identify an insurance effect and to distinguish between community-based insurance and spiritual
insurance. In section 5, we discuss the experimental results and conclude in section 6.
2 Context
2.1 Pentecostalism
Pentecostalism represents one of the fastest-growing segments of global Christianity. Approximately
one quarter of the world’s two billion Christians are members of churches that can be classified as
Pentecostal or Charismatic. These are related movements of Protestant Christianity that emphasize
3Gershman (2016) demonstrates a negative association between trust and the presence of witchcraft beliefs, while
Hadnes and Schumacher (2012) experimentally find that priming vodoo beliefs increases trust and trustworthiness.
Nunn and de la Sierra (2017) document the prevalence of beliefs in protective spells in South Congo, arguing that these
beliefs helped village residents coordinate a stronger resistance against enemy fighters.
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the work of a Holy Spirit and claim that spiritual gifts, such as prophecy, divine healing and speaking
in tongues are expected to be present in the lives of believers (Pew Research Center, 2006). Although
Pentecostal and Charismatic movements differ in some aspects, these aspects are marginal for our
study, and we will use the term Pentecostal broadly. This makes sense especially in Ghana and across
Africa, where popular speech hardly draws a distinction between the two (Okyerefo, 2011; Botha,
2007).
The striking growth of this movement of global Christianity has largely taken place over the last
three decades (Botha, 2007; Thelen, 2017). The speed with which Pentecostal congregations have
grown is particularly remarkable as most typical definitions of the movement only date their begin-
nings to the early 1900s. This marked change in the composition of global Christianity has been so
significant that a number of commentators refer to the Pentecostal explosion as a “new Reforma-
tion”(Thelen, 2017; Jenkins, 2011).4 Sub-Saharan Africa has been an important centre of this change.
Estimates from 2015 suggest that almost 40% of the continent’s Christians identify as Pentecostal
or Charismatic.5 This reflects the wider shift in the Pentecostal revival from the Global North to
the Global South. Although many early Pentecostal churches in sub-Saharan Africa were planted
and funded by American missionaries, much of the dramatic growth that has taken place since the
1980s has been fuelled by indigenous developments in theology, teaching and practice. Many scholars
argue that preexisting belief systems and economic conditions made sub-Saharan Africa particularly
receptive to Pentecostal teachings (see for instance Ukah, 2005).
Participants in our experiment were recruited from different branches of the Assemblies of God
(AoG), one of the oldest and most established Pentecostal denominations. Founded in 1914 in the
United States of America, the denomination now has an international reach that covers approximately
360 000 churches in more than 250 countries (Assemblies of God World Missions, 2017). National AoG
bodies are largely autonomous, but are united by some shared beliefs and a common history. Taken
together, Assemblies of God fellowships form the largest Pentecostal denomination, and the sixth
4Comparing the reformation of 16th century Europe with the “new reformation” of Pentecostal-charismatic Chris-
tianity, theologian Harvey Cox states that “today, Christianity is living through a reformation that will prove to be
even more basic and more sweeping than the one that shook Europe during the sixteenth century . . . That earlier
reformation. . . was confined to one small corner of the globe. The current reformation, however, is an earth-circling one.
The present reformation is shaking the foundations more dramatically than its sixteenth century predecessor, and its
results will be more far-reaching and radical.”(Cox, 2011)
5Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo, eds. World Christian Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007).
http://worldchristiandatabase.org
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largest religious grouping in the world.6 About a third of the worldwide Assemblies of God adherents
are found in sub-Saharan Africa. This represents approximately 22 million adherents (Assemblies of
God World Missions, 2017), about 2.5 million of whom are in Ghana.7 In Ghana they represent just
under 8% of the national population, attracting members from all social strata.
Many of these teachings that have taken root and been developed in sub-Saharan churches are
shared by Pentecostal believers across the world in the transnational exchange of ideas and resources
that characterises Pentecostalism today (Gifford, 2004; Kalu, 2008). There is, of course, considerable
heterogeneity in beliefs and practices within individuals in a given church, across branches within a
single denomination, and across denominations of the broader Pentecostal movement. However, the
key features of Pentecostal belief and practice, which are important for the interpretation of our study
design, are widely shared. By focusing recruitment from a popular and established denomination, we
are able to draw out insights that should be applicable to this large and growing movement, and to
other religious practices that share certain features of these beliefs.
2.2 The role of the church in Pentecostalism
In terms of practice, the church is an essential part of life for Pentecostal adherents. They go to
church more regularly than other Christians and perform other religious practices more frequently.
For example, compared to the general population, Pentecostals pray and read the Bible more often,
and more frequently watch or listen to religious programs on television and radio. They are also more
likely to share their beliefs with others to spread their faith (Pew Research Center, 2006).
Members also enjoy non-spiritual benefits from their church. An essential function of Pentecostal
churches in Ghana, in particular in urban areas, is to offer a place for social gathering. Tables 7 and 8
in Appendix A show descriptive statistics of selected answers from our study questionnaire about the
social and financial role of churches. Over half the participants declare that they have a preference for
close friends drawn from the church. And Table 13 shows that around 40% of our study participants
declare that they have found their spouse (or are most likely to find their future spouse if not already
6www.adherents.com
7Todd M. Johnson and Gina A. Zurlo, eds. World Christian Database (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007).
http://worldchristiandatabase.org
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married) in church. Some church members even report that they favor other church members as
business partners (42% of respondents in our study, Table 8 in Appendix A).
More fundamentally, people seem to be attracted to such churches because they feel part of a
broader community which looks after them, whether through other church members, church leaders,
or God. When faced with any personal or family problems, 32% would go for help or advice to the
church leadership and 26% to someone in the church community (Table 7 in Appendix A). This is
consistent with survey evidence from the Afrobarometer and the World Values Survey showing that
across Africa, religious leaders are considered amongst the most trustworthy members of civil society.
They are expected to take responsibility for their members’ welfare in the absence of government-led
social interventions and urbanization enhances these expectations (McCauley, 2013).
Pentecostal adherents are expected to support their church financially. Giving is often multi-layered
and different ways of transferring money might have different motivations. Tithing, the practice of
giving away a tenth of all income, usually takes the form of a non-anonymous monthly payment to
the church for which church members receive a receipt. This type of giving is akin to a member-
ship fee to the church community. On the other hand, there is giving for specific purposes such as
pledges, which are occasional non-anonymous donations involving large amounts of money, often for
investment in church infrastructure. Finally, there are spontaneous offerings, made on a more regular
basis, which are generally anonymous and the amounts given unobserved (though during collections
in Sunday services the fact of going forward to give may be very visible to a member’s friends and
family). Opportunities for this form of giving are frequent and contributions are expected beyond the
other regular or earmarked forms of giving. This includes among others seed offerings - the practice
of giving money in anticipation of a future material benefit, or thanksgivings in gratitude for already
materialized benefits (Maxwell, 1998; Gifford, 2004). The type of giving we observe in our experiment
falls into this category of spontaneous giving.
2.3 Giving to God to access insurance
Giving to the church might interact with the use of the church as an insurer in a number of ways.
Firstly, individuals might give to the church in expectation that the church as an institution would
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reward this sign of commitment by disbursing funds in times of need. Secondly, individuals might use
their public giving to send signals that they are good community members to other church members,
and expect that other church members then contribute to help them in times of need. The costs of
religious participation can be seen as screening mechanisms to ensure that members are reliable and
to prevent free-riding (Iannaccone, 1992). Additionally, the community structure of the group with
repeated interactions reduces monitoring costs (Berman, 2000). These two types of community-based
insurance could be considered “material” insurance.
In addition to its role as a social network, the church is also believed by its members to be a setting
for encounters with the divine. The church therefore has a value as an insurer because it facilitates
access to an interventionist god who can prevent negative shocks and favor positive ones. We call
this type of insurance “spiritual” insurance. Like the community-based material insurance, spiritual
insurance is a potential response towards risk. However, it is a preventive measure to decrease the
(subjective) likelihood of an economic shock and, thus, not insurance in the strict sense. This form
of insurance is interesting because it does not rely solely on giving to the church but on “giving to
God”, which can be interpreted as undertaking projects that will be blessed by God, or “sowing on
any fertile ground” (Gifford, 2004). This expansive interpretation of “giving to God” allows us to
extend our experimental design to investigate how participants react to giving to recipients which are
separate from the church, but which still fulfil the spiritual mandate. This allows us to make some
distinctions about the different types of insurance experienced in the church. These mechanisms are
formalised in the model in Section 4 of the paper, and the doctrinal features are discussed here.
The first and most prominent feature is the forthright relationship between giving to God and
material well-being. Pentecostal preachers across Africa speak of a God who does not want His people
to be poor or to suffer.8 This mandate is often described as a variant of the “Prosperity Gospel”,
the set of teachings that say that “Christianity has to do with success, wealth, and status” (Gifford,
2004).9 And in contrast to other Christian groups where rewards are generally given out in the after
8Enoch Adeboye, head of the Lagos-based international Pentecostal megachurch Redeemed Christian Church of God,
teaches, “God is not poor at all by any standard...the closest friends of God [in the Bible] were wealthy people... Poverty
is a curse and prosperity is not evil” (Ukah, 2005, pg 260). Similarly (Gifford, 2004) pg 50 cites a pastor proclaiming
”God is in the business of addition and multiplications; Satan is in the business of substraction and division.”
9While the term “Prosperity gospel” has typically been used to describe teachings from some Evangelical churches
in North America, some scholars of African Pentecostal theologies argue that the “African prosperity gospel” is more
nuanced, certain aspects of it “are borrowed from external sources; others are home-grown. Still others are derived from
external sources and adapted to fit local contexts” (Kalu, 2008)
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life, it is usually pointed out that the expected time frame of miracles is short and immediate.10 The
immediacy of the miraculous work is reflected in the structure of many church services that are themed
around the material successes of its members proclaimed in lively testimonies.11 Pastors emphasize
how behaving in a manner that unlocks God’s blessing helps to avoid the risks that get in the way
of achieving these successes. Their preaching makes a particularly strong and explicit link between
giving to God and insurance. For example, an excerpt from a sermon preached in Ghana states:
“The Lord will remember your offering; it is comprehensive assurance” (Gifford, 2004, Pg 46).12 And
unlocking God’s blessings is invariably achieved by “doing something special that will move God and
cause him to bless you more than you intended” i.e. giving money, preferably to the church (Ukah,
2005).
3 Experiment
We conducted an experiment in Accra, Ghana in two stages. The first wave was run in November
and December 2015 with 576 participants. The main hypotheses that were pre-registered and tested
were the average differences between the treatment groups.
We ran the second wave in May and June 201913 with 494 participants because a subset of wave
1 participants attended the sessions during weeks in which their churches were hosting large revival
events. This inadvertently violated our experiment protocol, under which sessions were held on week-
days to avoid conducting experiments with subjects who had been in church on the same day. However,
revival week events are conducted all through the work week. We had not pre-registered the exclusion
of revival participants (or any church member visiting the church on the same day), and indeed their
results yielded interesting insights consistent with our model. The second wave was an opportunity to
pre-specify and test a hypothesis about revival week attendance. We used an encouragement design to
randomly assign some wave 2 participants to attend sessions during a revival week. We also use wave
10Some declarations made during a church service include: “Before the year comes to an end, there are people here
who will be counting millions of dollars in their accounts...”, “This month, no accident sickness, stagnation will affect
you” or “Marriages don’t collapse here, businesses don’t collapse here, nobody fails here” (Gifford, 2004) Pg 50 and 58)
11Gifford cites some testimony themes that include the following: ”I am a millionaire today!”, ”Jobs started coming
in!”, “My own choice car!”, “Now they pay me in dollars!”, “A Baby, Two Cars, and Promotion”.
12Other examples include: ’The preacher asked the congregation if they were putting aside for a rainy day, but
promised: ‘If you give, you won’t have a rainy day”’ (Gifford, 2004, Pg 50). ”Every part of your destiny is assured by
God, insured by God” (Gifford, 2004, Pg58).
13With encouragement from a referee and the editor, to whom we are grateful.
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2 to conduct a direct replication of our original experiment with non-revival participants to verify if
the results are robust to inevitable changes in the environment (such as a different part of the city,
different socio-economic characteristics, inflation etc).14 The resulting increased sample size allows
higher precision and facilitates exploratory heterogeneity analysis.
Randomisation was done at the session level. At the start of each session, one participant per group
was invited to pick one out of three unmarked envelopes. Participants were told that the envelopes
contained a piece of paper that would determine the type of session they would play. This information
was shared with participants to prevent incorrect guesses about the different possibilities and to avoid
that participants who heard from other about the insurance believed that they would receive it in the
end. The pieces of paper were labelled “Insurance”, which corresponded to our insurance enrolment
treatment; “Insurance information”, which corresponded to the control, and “No insurance”, which
corresponded to the no insurance information treatment (i.e., groups who were not enrolled in the
policy and did not have any sort of discussion about insurance). The insurance was a funeral insurance
policy offered by a leading micro-insurer active in the Ghanaian market. The outcomes we measured
were allocations out of an endowment (which subjects were free to keep, all or in part) towards a
participant’s church and two other non-church recipients.
3.1 Enrollment treatment: Funeral insurance policy
Funerals are large and costly events in many sub-Saharan African societies (Berg, 2016; Case et al.,
2013). Surviving family members are expected to honor the dead through lavish commemorations.
The rising toll of funeral costs has received attention from media, academics and political leaders.15
More recently private financial service providers have begun to offer savings and insurance products
designed specifically to meet these costs.
14Between 2015 and 2019, Ghana experienced year-on-year inflation rates of 17.45, 12.37, 9.39 and 9.50 respectively
(see https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG). Prices and purchasing power changed over this
period, including the premium and payouts of the insurance. We adjust endowments and show-up fees of the experiment
accordingly. However, due to rounding and pricing decisions of the insurance company, amongst other changes, the
amounts used in wave 2 prevent this from being an exact replication.
15See for instance ”The long goodbye: Why funerals are big deals in Ghana” By Paula New-
ton available at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/11/world/africa/on-the-road-ghana-funerals/index.html and
”Bankruptcy and burials: Can Ghanaians afford such splendid funerals?” The Economist 2007 available at
http://www.economist.com/node/9234475, and also ”Death around the world: Funerals and fantasy coffins in Ghana”
available at https://www.funeralzone.co.uk/blog/death-around-the-world-funerals-in-ghana
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In Ghana, guests and other members of the bereaved’s community typically make contributions
that help to cover the funeral costs. It is important to note that community support is not only
financial - churches also organise provision of food and moral and logistical support, so any formal
insurance product will only be addressing a single aspect of the church contributions. The degree
of formalisation of this type of support varies across the churches in our sample. In interviews with
church leaders, most confirmed that observed commitment from members was a prerequisite for church
involvement in their funerals. Definitions of commitment always included attendance of church events
and financial commitment to the church in terms of tithes and offerings.
We offered participants a micro-insurance policy available on the Ghanaian market. The policy
offered individual enrollment into a group policy. Pastors of each church branch acted as the coordina-
tors of the policies. This meant that the insurance company would channel any group communications
(e.g. new tarifs) through the pastor, but all financial and administrative aspects of the policy rested
with the company. The policy covered the life of the participant and a member of his or her immediate
family. If either of these parties were to pass away within a year, the policy would pay GHS 1000
($265 in 2015; the payout was kept at GHS 1000 in 2019 which because of the inflation was worth
roughly GHS 630 in 2015) to the surviving family members. This policy cost GHS 12.5 ($3USD in
2015; GHS 20 in 2019) for two family members per year.16 Individuals in this treatment were enrolled
on the spot after completing a demographic survey and before playing the dictator game.
3.2 Control group and no insurance information treatment
During pre-tests it became clear that discussions of death and planning around death would be sen-
sitive topics. Reluctance to contemplate large unpleasant risks has been raised in the literature,
particularly in other developing country settings where people are severely limited in the steps they
can take to address these risks (Case et al., 2013). Furthermore, findings in psychological research
show that awareness of mortality can modify Christians’ religiosity and beliefs in a supernatural entity
(see for instance Jong et al., 2012; Norenzayan and Hansen, 2006). As the insurance treatment was
designed to isolate the effect of being enrolled in insurance, we offered the same information about the
insurance policy to the control group, so that the same issues of death would be salient in both settings.
16One main goal of the group micro-insurance is to have a simplified scheme and low coordination costs. This implied
that the tariff was independent of the gender, age or other characteristic of the insured. The main insurance taker only
had to be above the age of 18 and below the age of 75 who could then insure his/her children and other close family
members under the age of 75.
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In order to see whether the greater salience of the risk of death that results from discussion of
insurance was in itself affecting subjects’ willingness to donate, we added a second treatment where
people were not informed about the content of the insurance policy. Comparisons between this group
that did not discuss death and the control group that received insurance information allow us to see
how church members react to an increase of perceived risk in the absence of formal insurance.
3.3 Recruitment
We recruited 1070 (576 in wave 1 and 494 in wave 2) study participants from sixteen different church
branches within one particular denomination.17 We approached these churches using a snowball
sampling strategy. Participants were informed of the experiment through announcements made on
Sunday mornings during regular church services. To avoid confounds with normal Sunday offering, all
sessions took place during the subsequent work week in a neutral location. In wave 1, a subset of 122
participants were inadvertently recruited during “revival weeks” when their churches were engaged in
active fundraising services during the work week. We found interesting results for this subset. In the
second wave, we therefore purposely sampled and randomized experiment participation during revival
and standard church weeks. The results for this subset of subjects are discussed after presenting the
main experimental results, which involve 849 participants in the two waves.18
17For five of these sixteen churches, fewer than 30 members participated in our experiment. In analysis, we group
all participants from these churches into one of two categories called ”Other church wave 1” and ”Other church wave
2”. We were able to conduct extended interviews with pastors from ten of the sixteen branches to learn more about
the structure of their services, membership, and other church events. This information is summarized in Tables 9 and
10 in the Appendix. The branches are heterogeneous in terms of age, size, members’ characteristics, and geographical
locations in the city. They represent the great diversity of Assemblies of God branches that can be found in Accra.
18We were also interested in seeing how our hypothesised mechanisms operate within a secular organisation, so we
recruited an additional 242 market sellers. Traders in this market are organized into an association that could provide
financial assistance such as credit or insurance to dues-paying members. During the first round of data collection, we
realized that the insurance treatment was not properly implemented in this sample as it was with the group of church
members. Indeed, the funeral insurance was coordinated by the head of the market association. Informal discussions
with study participants as well as their answers to survey questions warned us that trust in the insurance coordinator
might be low. It therefore seemed likely to us that participants would not trust that the insurance would be actually
implemented, thus discrediting the insurance treatment. Furthermore, questionnaire answers informed us that the
market association is not a commonly-used risk sharing structure, and is by no means similar to the church community
in that respect. We therefore stopped collecting data on market members after the first round of the study and the
sample for this group is too small to be able to detect treatment effects. Results from this smaller additional sample
are available from the authors on request.
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3.4 Experimental Setup and Design
It was very important for the credibility of our study that, with the exception of recruitment, all
interactions with participants took place off church premises and that participants were assured of
anonymity so as to avoid any contamination of the results by perceived pressure from the church au-
thorities. This involved a substantial effort to transport the recruited individuals to a study location
at some distance from the church, as well as the setting up of a proper lab-in the-field with laptops and
room dividers between subjects so as to make the assurance of anonymity credible. All participants
were compensated for transport to the neutral locations.
Interested participants were assigned to sessions. 77% of participants were in sessions of 6 - 12
people. The remaining sessions that were smaller or larger than this range occurred randomly across
treatments, dates, churches, revival and non-revival weeks.19 A session consisted of randomisation as
described above, an extended survey where each participant was interviewed by an enumerator who
spoke the participant’s local language, a set of dictator game decisions and private payment.20
Table 1: Pairs of dictator game recipients.
A Self Church (anonymous)
B Self Street children
C Self Thanksgiving
D Self Church (non-anonymous)
E Church (anonymous) Street children
F Church (anonymous) Thanksgiving
G Church (anonymous) Church (non-anonymous)
H Street children Thanksgiving
I Street children Church (non-anonymous)
J Thanksgiving Church (non-anonymous)
Participants privately played 10 dictator games. Each game asked participants to allocate GHS
11 between two recipients (GHS 19 in 2019 to adjust for changes in purchasing power; both amounts
represent a little less than average daily income). The set of recipients consisted of the participant’s
church, a secular charity, a national prayer organisation, and the possibility of keeping the money.
There were also two ways in which individuals would give to the church: the first being an anonymous
19Sessions with fewer than 4 individuals were excluded as per our pre-analysis plan.
20The survey was done before the game. First, this had a logistical motivation as the survey was done with the
enumerators who subsequently explained the game and then left so participants could play privately. Second, the
survey was the component that we focused on most during recruitment and cooperation with the churches. This was
done to avoid subjects feeling like they were “playing games”.
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donation, the second being a named donation. The pairs of recipients are listed in Table 1. The order
of the 10 dictator games was randomized by the computer program.21
The Street Children’s Fund is a charity that takes care of the education needs of homeless and
vulnerable children. The charity operates in a district of the city that is geographically and cultur-
ally distinct from the ones where we recruited participants. Giving to this charity could largely be
understood as an altruistic action. The thanksgiving offering is part of an annual inter-faith prayer
event. Leaders and members of various faiths join together in prayer for Ghana. Giving towards this
event was meant to be interpreted as giving towards a largely spiritual interest. Pre-tests and focus
groups during piloting confirmed that study participants would indeed see these two recipients of their
donations in this manner.
Participants were paid a flat show-up fee of GHS 20 in 2015 (GHS 30 in 2019). After all decisions
had been made in the dictator games, one game was selected at random individually for each partici-
pant, and further payments were made according to the decision taken for that game. This meant that
participants had the opportunity to earn up to GHS 31 (GHS 49 in 2019). Average overall earnings
from the experiment were GHS 22.50 (GHS 38.00 in 2019) which were paid privately to participants.
The experiment protocol and the questionnaire can be found in the appendix. This experiment was
pre-registered in the AEA registry.22 The second wave was pre-registered with a detailed pre-analysis
plan. There were two deviations from the protocol in wave 1. First, we stopped the experiment with
a market sample because the sellers did not trust their market leaders, which made it impossible to
implement the insurance treatment. Second, we did not anticipate the revival weeks therefore we did
not pre-register that we would exclude revival participants or analyse their effects separately.
Wave 2 allowed us to address the revival week concern by running a new experiment. There were
three unavoidable changes to the main protocol between wave 1 and wave 2. First, we adjusted out-
comes in 2019 for inflation, which meant that participants faced GHS 19 instead of GHS 11 allocation
21Regarding anynonymous and non-anonymous donations, one concern is that participants that see named donations
before anonymous choices may think about the latter in a different way. We randomize the order of the dictator games
precisely to address this type of concern. However, we also checked whether seeing named donations before anonymous
ones affect later choices to give to church anonymously and we find that this is not the case.
22AEA RCT Registry ID: AEARCTR-0000558 for the first wave and AEARCTR-0003989 for the second wave
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choices. Second, the insurance company maintained the payout at GHS 1000 despite adjusting the
premium for inflation. This meant that wave 2 participants were treated with a smaller dose than
wave 1 participants. Finally, due to the timing of field work, the national thanksgiving offering was 1
month in the future during wave 1, while it had just taken place during wave 2. This implies that the
next national thanksgiving event we asked our subjects to contribute to was going to be in one year.
This likely affected its perception as a relevant spiritual good.
Table 11 in Appendix A shows the numbers of subjects by wave and by treatment.
4 Model
We develop a simple model to formalize the types of behaviour we expect our experiment to capture,
and use results from the model to motivate the experimental hypotheses. First we establish how
church members who derive utility from secular as well as spiritual consumption would behave given
the risk of an exogenous income shock in a bad state of the world, if there is no insurance offered by
the church. We then consider two church-based insurance channels. Community-based insurance is
modelled as a payment given to a church member in the case of a loss where the size of the payment
depends on how much the church member gives to their own church. Spiritual insurance is modelled
as a belief that the subjective probability of a loss is reduced by giving to the church and other goods
used for religious signalling, such as the spiritual and secular charities. Spiritual insurance is, there-
fore, not an insurance contract in the narrow sense.23
The mechanisms of our experiment are captured in the model as changes to the size of the loss.
The insurance scheme into which we enrolled individuals paid out in the event of their own death or
the death of a relative. The loss we model is a financial loss and is not intended to cover all of the
aspects of the distress suffered by an individual facing the death of a loved one, let alone the adverse
emotional and other consequences to them of their own death. As in any life insurance decision, the
individual does not expect to be compensated for their own death, but intends rather to offset in part
23Divine intervention can also take the form of reducing the severity of shocks rather than reducing their probability
of occurrence. This type of insurance mechanism would be observationally indistinguishable from belief in a divine
intervention that reduces the probability of shocks. However, based on the narrative propagated by Pentecostal churches
described in section 2, we model spiritual insurance as a belief that donation behavior affects the probability of occurrence
of shocks.
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the financial consequences of a death to those still left alive. Individuals are capable of anticipat-
ing the benefit of that payout and considering it as a (possibly vicarious) benefit in anticipation of
which they are willing to pay a premium, even if they do not expect to be alive when the payout occurs.
There are two ways in which our insurance treatments may affect the size of the loss. The first is
when insurance information is provided to participants. The process necessitates a discussion about
death both of the participating individual and his or her loved ones. This discussion brings home to
participants the reality of a risk they had perhaps been inclined not to think about, and thereby makes
death more salient. We represent this as an increase in the perceived size of the loss, compared to the
situation before they had received this information. However, this interpretation of the provision of
information is necessarily tentative; we return to the question in discussing the results below.
The second way in which our insurance treatment affects the size of the loss is when individuals
are actually enrolled. We represent this as a reduction in the perceived size of the loss.
We show how in the presence of an insurance motive in the church, the main insurance treatment
can lead to a decrease in giving, and the provision of only insurance information can lead to an increase
in giving.
4.1 Setup
We assume that a church member has an income of Y and chooses to give an amount g to the church.
The church member enjoys utility u(Y − g) from consuming Y − g ≥ 0 secular goods, and utility
θf(g) from contributing g ≥ 0 to church goods. Thus a church member who gives g to the church
enjoys a total utility of u(Y − g) + θf(g). The parameter θ reflects the relative weight the individ-
ual puts on church activities compared to secular consumption. This weight might differ from one
individual to the next (there may be individual heterogeneity). More importantly for our empirical
analysis it might also differ in time (for instance, in revival weeks individuals go to church every day
and are focused on spiritual activities). Both utility functions u and f are increasing and concave
in their arguments. We therefore make the assumption that religious consumption is a normal good.24
24This assumption contradicts the secularization hypothesis that higher income leads to lower religiosity. However, it
is in line with new studies using panel or micro data (Becker and Woessmann, 2013) and (Buser, 2015). A theoretical
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In each period, church members face a probability π of an income loss of size D. Under the as-
sumption that insurance is offered through the church, giving an amount g also has the impact of
reducing the size of the loss by an amount l(g), thus the total loss would be D − l(g). Under the
assumption that church members believe in spiritual insurance, the probability of a loss is decomposed
into a basic probability of loss π̃, and a reduction in the probability of loss that can be mitigated by
giving money to spiritual goods. Therefore, the total subjective probability of loss is π = π̃ − p(g).
The following subsections set-up the maximization problems and show how optimal giving varies
with the perceived size of loss. We assume that church members choose a particular level of giving g
to maximize their total expected utility. All proofs are in the appendix.
4.2 Optimal giving to the church in the absence of any insurance




(1− π)u(Y − g) + πu(Y − g −D) + θf(g) (1)
Solving for the first order conditions and taking optimal giving g∗ as a function of D allows us to




This classical result of consumption smoothing comes from the standard concavity assumptions of the
utilities derived from secular and religious consumption. When faced with an increase in the potential
loss D, church members shift spending from religious consumption to secular consumption to ensure
a higher level of secular consumption in case of loss. We call this result the “income effect”.
Therefore, this subsection predicts that if there is no insurance mechanism in the church (neither
community-based, nor spiritual), the information about the funeral policy in the control group, by
rationale for the positive association of income on religious consumption can be found in club good models of religion
(Iannaccone, 1992; Berman, 2000; Berman and Laitin, 2008).
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increasing the perceived loss D, would lead individuals to decrease church giving g∗. We summarize
this empirical prediction of Hypothesis H0 in the form of:
Empirical prediction H0a: Compared to no information, insurance information decreases giving to
the church.
Correspondingly, compared to the control group, the enrolment treatment reduces the perceived
risk of loss, thereby decreasing D, and thus would increase giving to the church. The second empirical
prediction of Hypothesis H0 is therefore:
Empirical prediction H0b: Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment increases
giving to the church.
4.3 Community insurance: optimal giving when giving reduces the size of
a loss
In this section we assume that the church community provides material insurance such that church
giving reduces the size of the loss. We call this Hypothesis H1, and we write L = D − l(g), where
l is an increasing and concave function with l(0) = 0 and l′(0) > 1 (this last condition means that
the community insurance in the bad state more than offsets the amount previously donated by the
individual). In this case, church giving can be seen as payment of the premium of an informal insurance
that covers part of the possible loss. As it is offered by the church community, only giving to the
church - and not giving to other religious goods - provides access to this type of insurance. The utility
maximization problem is as follows:
max
g
(1− π)u(Y − g) + πu(Y − g −D + l(g)) + θf(g) (3)




> 0⇔ l′(g∗) > 1 (4)
When there is an insurance motive behind church donations, an increase in the potential loss D
triggers two opposite effects: the substitution effect, whereby church members try to mitigate the
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increase in loss by buying more informal insurance; and the income effect, described in the section
4.2 where church members reduce giving to the church to have more money available for secular con-
sumption smoothing.
Condition (4) shows that as long as community-based insurance is effective enough in decreasing
the loss, which is the case for low enough g∗, the consumption-smoothing effect from the baseline
model (income effect) is outweighed by the increased demand for church insurance (substitution ef-
fect). Therefore, the overall effect of an increase in D is an increase in the optimal giving.
This subsection therefore predicts that if there exists an effective community insurance that re-
duces the size of a loss in case of a shock, the information about insurance should increase church
giving (compared to no insurance information) while the enrolment treatment would decrease church
giving (compared to the control group). These effects are the opposite of the predicted effects dis-
cussed in the previous section, when there is no insurance motive for giving to the church. There
should be no impact of either treatment on giving to other recipients. The three empirical predictions
of Hypothesis H1 are therefore:
Empirical prediction H1a: Compared to no information, insurance information increases giving to
the church.
Empirical prediction H1b: Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment decreases giving
to the church.
Empirical prediction H1c: There is no effect of either insurance information or enrolment on giving
to the other recipients (the thanksgiving offering and the street children’s fund).
4.4 Spiritual insurance: optimal giving when giving reduces the subjective
probability of a loss
In this section we assume that there is a spiritual insurance motive such that giving reduces the
subjective probability of the loss π = π̃ − p(g). It is important to stress that giving can be to the
church or to any other charitable/spiritual organizations that can be used for religious signalling. The
mechanism here works through God: being a good Christian reduces the subjective probability of a
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negative shock. We call this Hypothesis H2. Utility can now be written as:
max
g
(1− π̃ + p(g))u(Y − g) + (π̃ − p(g))u(Y − g −D) + θf(g) (5)
We can show that:
∂g∗
∂D
> 0⇔ p′(g∗)u′(Y − g ∗ −D) > (π̃ − p(g∗))u′′(Y − g∗ −D) (6)
This condition is harder to interpret intuitively in the non-parametrized form, and for the second order
condition to hold requires that the second derivative of the utility function not increase too fast in the
size of the loss, which means that the income effect must not be large. So we defer the discussion to
the appendix where we investigate it using a CARA utility function. In short, we find that the optimal
giving g∗ is increasing in the size of loss D when the spiritual insurance is effective enough. Indeed,
when this is the case, individuals prefer to invest in decreasing the subjective probability of loss by
increasing their religious giving rather than smoothing consumption (in other words, the substitution
effect of the loss dominates the income effect).
Therefore, this subsection predicts that providing participants with insurance information would
increase giving to any charitable or spiritual organization (compared to no insurance information)
while enrolling them in the insurance treatment would decrease giving to any charitable or spiritual
organization (compared to the information treatment). The three empirical predictions of Hypothesis
H2 are therefore:
Empirical prediction H2a: Compared to no information, insurance information increases giving to
the church.
Empirical prediction H2b: Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment decreases giving
to the church.
Empirical prediction H2c: The effects on giving to the thanksgiving offering or the street children’s
fund are similar to the effects on giving to the church.
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4.5 Experimental hypotheses
We collect here all the empirical predictions of the three different insurance hypothesis so they can be
compared and tested against one another.
H0 There is no insurance provided through the church (section 4.2).
H0a Compared to no information, insurance information decreases giving to the church.
H0b Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment increases giving to the church.
H1 Community insurance is provided through the church (section 4.3).
H1a Compared to no information, insurance information increases giving to the church.
H1b Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment decreases giving to the church.
H1c There is no effect on giving to the thanksgiving offering or the street children’s fund.
H2 Spiritual insurance is provided through God (section 4.4).
H2a Compared to no information, insurance information increases giving to the church.
H2b Compared to insurance information, insurance enrollment decreases giving to the church.
H2c The effects on giving to the thanksgiving offering or the street children’s fund are similar
to the effects on giving to the church.
Our experimental design allows us to test for an insurance mechanism in giving (test for H0a
against H1a/H2a and H0b against H1b/H2b) and then test the two insurance channels of spiritual
and community-based insurance against each other (H1c against H2c). Spiritual insurance effects
should be similar across recipients. However they might be different in magnitude since, for instance,
church members could see church donations as the most effective tool to decrease the probability of a
loss.
Our model and experimental design do not allow us to make a clear prediction of the result if we
compared the group that received no insurance information to the group that received insurance. This
is because, as described in the model setup, the insurance treatment is composed of both the actual in-
surance effect which we are interested in and a salience effect. The model demonstrates how these two
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effects work in opposing directions. While we are unable to formulate an ex-ante hypothesis about the
overall comparison between receiving insurance and not receiving any information, we discuss the re-
sults in section 5.3.3, where we suggest some interpretations about the relative magnitudes we observe
and discuss what they might further tell us about the potential mechanisms of church-based insurance.
Finally, our experiment allows us to test for the average behavior within the church. This average
potentially captures heterogeneity in different parameters: Church members can vary in how much
they value donations to the church relative to secular consumption (variation in θ) and if they see a
insurance motive in their donations (if g enters in the probability function or the payoff function). In
sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 we discuss potential heterogeneity in the average treatment effect.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Our main results include 849 church members recruited during regular service weeks from sixteen25
different church branches; we have complete socio-demographic information for 804 of these.26 Table 2
summarises pre-registered variables of these participants. The groups were balanced across treatments
for all key variables except gender (women tend to be over-represented in the insurance information
and no insurance groups). An F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that these main demographic
variables do not jointly explain assignment to any of the treatments. In further tables, we report
results of regressions with and without control variables for individuals’ demographics (gender, age,
education, income, employment status, ethnicity) and measures of religious behavior (church atten-
dance and prayer frequency) as well as church fixed effects. The treatment effects remain similar, with
respect to both magnitude and statistical significance.
Compared to the national population, our participants had lower incomes and were less likely to
be employed (Table 12 in Appendix A). We believe that this selection is not a threat to external
validity: we are interested in the attitudes towards insurance in precisely this significant subgroup
of the general population who are likely to be particularly vulnerable and face a greater number of
25Churches with fewer than 30 participants in our study are grouped in an “other church” category for analysis.
26The questionnaire software malfunctioned during the first few sessions, so some survey data were not saved. There
were no problems with data from the dictator games.
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Table 2: Pre-registed covariates compared across treatments.
Summary of covariates across treatments, pooled sample.
Differences(p-value)
Variable Insurance Insurance information No insurance Insurance - info Info - no
Age 36.90 37.69 36.68 0.79(0.45) −1.01(0.33)
Female 0.64 0.65 0.71 0.01(0.77) 0.06(0.09)
Monthly income, GHS 312.09 310.63 302.94 −1.46(0.95) −7.69(0.72)
Employed 0.62 0.58 0.63 −0.03(0.35) 0.05(0.18)
More than secondary school 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.01(0.66) −0.02(0.49)
Akan ethnicity 0.34 0.31 0.30 −0.02(0.50) −0.01(0.74)
Ewe ethnicity 0.20 0.25 0.17 0.05(0.10) −0.08(0.01)
Ga ethnicity 0.13 0.10 0.16 −0.03(0.16) 0.06(0.02)
Attends church daily 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00(0.93) 0.00(0.97)
Prays multiple times per day 0.87 0.90 0.85 0.02(0.35) −0.04(0.10)
Attended during revival week 0.21 0.27 0.15 0.07(0.04) −0.13(0.00)
Wave 2 0.46 0.48 0.44 0.01(0.71) −0.03(0.36)
F-tests for joint significance
F-stat 0.35 1.73
P-value 0.97 0.07
Note P-values reported in parentheses are from a t-test of equality of means.
formally uninsured risks.
We can also compare some key demographic variables across waves of the experiment. Table 12
in Appendix A shows pre-registered covariates, many of which differed across waves. Table 13 shows
demographic variables that were not pre-registered. These are not included as controls in any regres-
sions. Thirty-three percent (85% in wave 2) had registered for the National Health Insurance scheme
and only 18% (10% in wave 2) held any other sort of insurance prior to participating in the study.
None of the participants in wave 1 had spent their whole lives in their current church; 44% of wave 2
participants had done so.
The time elapsed and the constraint to move the study to a different part of the city to work
with church branches that were not contacted for the first wave explain the differences between the
two sample populations. These differences should certainly be borne in mind when interpreting our
results. Nevertheless, we believe it reinforces the validity of our results that they should be broadly
robust to such differences across waves; this indicates that we are observing features of their shared
religious practice rather than idiosyncratic features of particular socio-demographic groups.
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5.2 Summary of the allocation decisions
In this subsection and the following we focus on the three dictator games among the ten played where
anonymous donations to the three recipients were paired with the possibility to keep the money.
Results from the other games are discussed in subsection 5.5. The histograms in Figure 1 plot the
distributions of giving to the three different recipients. On average, participants chose to keep 51%
of their endowment (5.64 GHS in wave 1 and 9.75 GHS in wave 2) and give away 49% of the endowment.
Figure 1: Distributions of giving among participants.
Note Data from 849 participants from weeks with no revival events, pooled across both waves. Participants chose how
much of an endowment to allocate between themselves and different recipients. The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS
in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019.
44% of participants selected an allocation close to the equal split of either 5 GHS or 6 GHS in wave
1 (9 GHS or 10 GHS in wave 2). Across recipients, roughly 5% of participants gave nothing, and 6%
of participants gave everything away. These spikes at the extreme values highlight that allocations to
the recipients may have been censored. To account for this, we report all experimental results using
a Tobit regression.
Giving towards the three recipients is significantly correlated, with the correlation coefficients be-
tween the pairs of choices ranging from 0.52 to 0.59. If the experimental design induced any order
effects, these high degrees of correlation could be problematic for interpretations across recipients.
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However, the order of dictator decisions was randomised across participants, mitigating the concern
that any order effects could interact with treatment effects.
We now turn to the discussion of the results. Section 5.3 focuses on the pooled analysis. The
question of the comparison of the two waves and the degree of confidence we can reasonably have in
the results is discussed in section 5.4.
5.3 Treatment effects
5.3.1 Compared to insurance information, insurance enrolment decreases giving to the
church and also to the other recipients.
We first examine the main ways in which donation behavior is affected by enrollment into insurance
as opposed to the mere provision of insurance information.27 Figure 2 shows the treatment effects of
the three main dictator games of interest. The figure shows separate effects from wave 1 and wave 2 as
well as two ways of aggregating the estimates, either by estimating a single effect on the pooled sample
or by taking a precision weighted mean of the separate effects as is common in meta-analytic studies
(Christensen et al., 2019). Table 3 presents the regression coefficients for the two separate waves as
well as for the pooled analysis. Table 3 shows results of Tobit regressions with and without individual
controls and dummies for individual churches - for the reasons of representativity just mentioned, the
results with controls are to be preferred for hypothesis testing.28
We find that enrolment into the insurance policy decreases giving to all three recipients compared
to those who only receive the information about the insurance but are not enrolled. The treatment
effects are also similar for the different recipients. All pooled treatment effects are significant at the
1% or 5% level. A decrease in the amount of donations is predicted by the hypothesis that giving has
some element of an insurance motivation. In addition, the fact that amounts given to all recipients
are similarly affected means that the expected insurance is through meritorious behavior in the eyes
of God, and not through paying in to a community insurance fund administered solely by the church.
This does not constitute evidence against the existence of such community insurance mechanisms, but
we do not find positive evidence of their existence here.
27This is listed as Test 1 in our pre-analysis plan.
28Tables 19 to 22 in Appendix B show results scaled by standardized outcomes and outcomes in local currency (cedis).
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Note Treatment effects estimated from comparison between insurance enrollment and insurance information. Estimates
from Tobit regressions including pre-registered covariates as controls. 95% confidence intervals shown.
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Table 3: Effects of insurance enrollment compared to insurance information for weeks with no revival
events.
Dependent variable:
giving to the church giving to the street giving to thanksgiving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pooled sample
insurance enrollment −0.064∗∗ −0.056∗∗ −0.064∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.055∗ −0.052∗∗
(0.030) (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025)
constant 0.554∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.078) (0.021) (0.079) (0.022) (0.083)
N 538 504 538 504 538 504
Panel B: Wave 1
insurance enrollment −0.083∗ −0.064∗ −0.084∗∗ −0.089∗∗ −0.085∗ −0.087∗
(0.043) (0.037) (0.039) (0.042) (0.046) (0.046)
constant 0.531∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.130) (0.034) (0.138) (0.037) (0.140)
N 285 251 285 251 285 251
Panel C: Wave 2
insurance enrollment −0.039 −0.044∗ −0.045 −0.046 −0.018 −0.007
(0.037) (0.025) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032) (0.021)
constant 0.581∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.091) (0.027) (0.109) (0.022) (0.098)
N 253 253 253 253 253 253
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Church dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table corresponds to ‘Main Test 1’ and ’Main Test 2.1’ in the
pre-analysis plan. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the
estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that
a participant allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with
street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day of thanksgiving
(columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19
GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator
for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a
dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because a computer
error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1. Constant terms cannot be compared across
waves in even-numbered columns due to the use of Church fixed effects.
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Finally, it is worth noting that the treatment effect is no stronger, and even somewhat weaker,
for named (non-anonymous) donations to the church, as can be seen in Table 16 of Appendix B. If
community insurance were the main motivation we would expect to see stronger treatment effects for
named than for anonymous donations.
The treatment effects are therefore consistent with Hypothesis 2 (spiritual insurance) and incon-
sistent with Hypothesis 0 (no insurance) and Hypothesis 1 (community insurance). More precisely,
the results are consistent with hypotheses H2b and H2c, which predict that enrolment decreases giv-
ing to the church and to other recipients respectively. They are inconsistent with Hypothesis H0b,
which predicts that enrolment increases giving to the church. And although they are consistent with
Hypothesis H1b (that enrolment decreases giving to the church) they are inconsistent with Hypothesis
H1c (that there is no effect on the other recipients).
5.3.2 The salience effect of insurance information is weakly positive but statistically
insignificant.
We now report the effect on donation behavior of a more salient threat of death.29 Discussing the
insurance details could render the risk of death more salient and potentially increase donations. Panel
A in Table 4 presents the results of providing insurance information on giving relative to the no insur-
ance information treatment. Participants who received no information on the insurance donated on
average 58.2% of their endowment to the church (column 1). Providing insurance information changes
this amount by 3.3 percentage points, which is not significant. Giving to the street children’s fund
and to the thanksgiving event are equally not significantly affected. In Panels B and C, the two waves
are presented separately. In the first wave, we find a significant salience effect on all recipients, but
this is absent in the second wave.
We interpret these results with reference to our model. We model the idea that death becomes
more salient with an increase in income loss D. Hypotheses H1a and H2a propose that if insurance is
offered through the church (either community based or spiritual), and D is increased, then giving to
29This was listed as Main Test 2 in our pre-analysis plan.
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Table 4: Effects of insurance information compared to no insurance for participants in weeks with no
revival events.
Dependent variable:
giving to the church giving to the street giving to thanksgiving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pooled
insurance information 0.038 0.032 0.039 0.033 0.016 0.009
(0.028) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.021)
constant 0.516∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.080) (0.015) (0.083) (0.018) (0.080)
N 548 519 548 519 548 519
Panel B: Wave 1
insurance information 0.071∗ 0.068∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.068∗ 0.061
(0.041) (0.037) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.037)
constant 0.459∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.136) (0.024) (0.144) (0.019) (0.138)
N 289 260 289 260 289 260
Panel C: Wave 2
insurance information −0.001 0.009 −0.014 −0.015 −0.045∗ −0.034∗
(0.029) (0.022) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.020)
constant 0.582∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.120) (0.016) (0.113) (0.015) (0.114)
N 259 259 259 259 259 259
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Church dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table corresponds to ’Main Test 1’ and ’Main Test 2.1’ in the
pre-analysis plan. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the
estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that
a participant allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with
street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day of thanksgiving
(columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19
GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator
for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a
dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because a computer
error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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the church and other recipients should increase. We find that insurance information does not increase
giving compared to no insurance. This would be consistent with H0 (no insurance offered through the
church) if it were not for our results on enrolment. Alternatively, this is consistent with an incorrect
assumption that discussions about death have the same effect as an increase in the size of D.
It is indeed likely that the discussion about death in wave 2 did not translate to a perceived increase
in the size of D. The enrollment effects discussed in 5.3.2 are based on a measurable and economically
relevant decrease in D (free enrollment into an insurance policy), and provide strong evidence against
H0. Furthermore, variability in the ways that insurance information makes D salient is consistent
with a growing literature that shows salience effects to be context dependent (Bordalo et al., 2012).
Understanding which attributes of a decision problem become salient, and under which conditions,
is an active area of study. Recent contributions in the economics literature have suggested that this
is influenced by an individual’s memory and experiences (Mullainathan, 2002; Bordalo et al., 2017),
that salience also tracks the usefulness of an attribute for predicting future behavior (Schwartzstein,
2014), and that the relative sizes of different outcomes also influences their salience (Bordalo et al.,
2012). These channels highlight how the framing and context in which information is presented mat-
ters for the salience of attributes of a decision problem. Small differences in the sample population or
unavoidable changes in procedure between wave 1 and wave 2 (e.g. different enumerators presenting
the description of insurance) might have affected how participants perceived the importance of the
risk of death.
This does not imply that the effects of salience are of low scientific interest. In their sermons,
pastors frequently try to make salient various life risks (such as the risk of death, or of joblessness,
or marital failure), while suggesting donations as a means of coping with these risks. An interesting
avenue for research would be to investigate which conditions need to be fulfilled to find a salience
effect that increases donations. Presumably, some pastors are better at it than others.
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5.3.3 The effect of insurance (salience plus enrollment) compared to no insurance is
positive but not significant.
Table 17 in Appendix B shows that the net effect of the two treatments (the salience effect plus
the treatment effect of interest, which work in opposite directions) is to yield an impact of receiving
insurance compared to being given no information that is negative but not significant at conventional
levels. The model does not provide a clear prediction about this comparison as its sign depends on
the size of the salience and the insurance effects. Panel A shows that the overall net effect is not
significant. In wave 1 (Panel B), the enrolment and salient effects are of similar magnitudes. In wave
2 (Panel C), where we do not find a significant salience effect, the net effect of insurance is negative
although not consistently significant.
Church sermons themselves frequently combine the two effects (salience and insurance enrollment)
by talking about certain risks and suggesting donations as a means of coping with these risks. The
treatment effect of insurance enrollment is large enough (over 10% of the mean amount donated to
the church) to explain why churches appear to invest significant resources in seeking to make this
channel of activity credible. In wave 1, insurance enrollment decreased giving only in comparison to
the higher donations induced by the salience effect of the insurance information treatment. However,
this salience effect was not necessary to observe the enrollment effect in wave 2.
5.4 Replication and robustness of results
5.4.1 Replication of main treatment effect
As described in section 3.3, our study was conducted in two waves in order to verify a heteroge-
neous treatment effect that can be explained by our model but that we had not pre-registered prior
to wave 1. We discuss the heterogeneous treatment effect in section 5.5.2 below. Wave 2 also enabled
us to conduct a replication of the treatment effects from wave 1 in normal (non-revival) weeks. This
allows us to put our results in context with the growing literature on replicability of experimental
results in economics and other social sciences.
Camerer et al. (2016) look at 18 laboratory experiments published in leading economics journals
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between 2011 and 2014. They find that 13 (70%) successfully replicate according to one of four crite-
ria: i) effect sizes are in the same direction and pass the same level of statistical significance, ii) the
confidence interval of the new estimates includes the old estimates (Collaboration et al., 2015), iii)
the two estimates lie in a prediction interval that accounts for sampling variation in both waves (Patil
et al., 2016), and iv) the combined meta-analytic estimate is significant and in the same direction
(Christensen et al., 2019; Braver et al., 2014).
We can therefore examine separately the results for wave 1 and wave 2, and see to what extent they
fulfil one of the four criteria set out by (Camerer et al., 2016) for successful replication. In our exper-
iment (see Table 3), the effect of insurance enrollment on giving to the church is replicated according
to all four assessment criteria, though the treatment effect is significant at 10% only when controls
are included. The effect of insurance enrollment on giving to the street children’s fund is successfully
replicated according to three out of four measures. It does not meet the first criterion—although the
wave 2 effect is in the right direction and large enough to be consistent with the results from wave 1,
its p-value is greater than 0.1. The insurance benefits were not adjusted to inflation by the insurance
company and thus our treatment is 40% lower in wave 2, compared to wave 1. This might explain
why point estimates in wave 2 are lower. This suggests that our replication, though of the same
approximate size as the original experiment, has reduced power given the diminished magnitude of
the treatment.
The effect on giving to the thanksgiving offering is not replicated according to any criterion. This
is also the only outcome we were not able to implement in exactly the same way as in wave 1 as
the timing of the thanksgiving event was fixed (as described in Section 3). The national event had
already happened shortly beforehand, and our participants might have felt that paying (again) for
something that would presumably occur a year later was too distant. Nevertheless, the pooled effect
on giving to the thanksgiving offering is in the right direction and statistically significant at the 5%
level. The meta-analytic effect is also in the right direction, although its confidence interval includes
0. Reassuringly, this point estimate is contained within the 95% confidence intervals of the meta-
analytic estimates for the church and street children’s fund outcomes. For the two outcomes that
were successfully replicated (giving to the church and giving to the street children), the wave 2 effect
sizes were 75% and 62% of the wave 1 effect sizes, respectively.
35
5.4.2 Robustness: Effect of insurance enrollment on other allocation decisions
Panel A of Table 18 in Appendix B presents the donation levels when participants had to make the
choice between two recipient organisations, rather than between a single recipient and the option of
keeping money for themselves. It therefore constitutes a robustness test of the previous finding that
the treatment effects of salience and enrolment were similar in sign and magnitude across all three
recipients, which is a prediction of the theory of spiritual insurance but not of the theory of commu-
nity insurance. We do not find that church members in the insurance enrollment treatment split their
endowment significantly differently from church members who only received the information about the
insurance. This therefore constitutes additional supporting evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2 against
Hypothesis 1.
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 How does insurance work?
These experimental results point to an interesting relationship between the type of benefits parish-
ioners might believe they receive from belonging to a church and their willingness to make costly
donations to that church. Firstly, treatment effects of insurance enrollment are present across the
three recipients. As discussed earlier, neither the street children’s fund nor the national thanksgiving
offering are linked to the participant’s church; and the configuration of our experimental laboratory,
with physical partitions between the subjects, rules out any signaling motive to other participants or
to church authorities. If the type of insurance the participant associates with their church member-
ship were purely community based, there should not be a treatment effect on giving to these external
recipients.
Thus, the fact that the effects we find are similar for giving to the three different types of recipients
- the participant’ s own church, the thanksgiving association, and the street children fund - indicates
that a substantial part of the insurance channel works through beliefs that encourage giving as an
act of worship to an interventionist god. The questionnaire supports the idea that church members
believe in an interventionist god: less than 2% state that they do not believe god to be involved in
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their financial situation, 38% have attended a prayer camp within the last 2 years30 and 21% even
believe that there was a spiritual dimension to the last death in their family.
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the simultaneous existence of community based motives. Indeed,
our questionnaire also provides support for the existence of community-based church motives for many
participants in ordinary circumstances. All of the church branches state that they have a welfare fund
for church members in need, 22% of participants would ask the church community for financial help
if they were in need and 23% have already received financial assistance from the church in the past.
Our results, therefore, do not imply that spiritual insurance is the exclusive or even the main
motive behind giving to the church and that community-based insurance does not exist. In ordinary
life, church members are unlikely to think only about insurance against funeral expenses when giving
donations to the church. Church members face many risks and challenges other than funeral expenses.
Even if members think that the risks of death can be managed by undertaking actions that are meri-
torious in the eyes of God, they may still be attentive also to the benefits that may come from direct
assistance from the church when they need it.
5.5.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects: church members during fund-raising events
Up to this point, we have discussed results for church members recruited during normal service weeks.
In wave 1, after recruitment, we learnt that two churches had hosted ‘revival weeks’ during the
course of our experiments. Some of their members who participated in the experiment were sampled
during those revival weeks. Revival weeks are special periods of church activity where members are
encouraged to attend church daily. The services consist of prayer, teaching, singing, and exhortation
to give money to the church.31 In wave 2, we purposely sampled churches that were holding revival
weeks while we were collecting data. For two churches, we were able to randomize participation during
revival and non-revival weeks on an individual level.
In total, 221 church members across waves 1 and 2 participated in the experiment while they were
30Events organized to pray for miracles, such as healing or finding a marriage partner (see Arias et al., 2016).
31(Kwabena, 2015) describes revival meetings as an essential feature of contemporary Pentecostal worship. Access to
these material benefits is accomplished through religious activities including “massive revival meetings, summits and
conferences, all day prayer services and all-night prophetic vigils and mass evangelistic crusades”.
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Table 5: Comparing demographic variables and religious behaviour across participants who took part
in regular and revival weeks
Variable Revival = 0 Revival = 1 Difference (p-value)
Age 37.24 36.44 −0.80 (0.44)
Attends church daily 0.04 0.06 0.02 (0.24)
Employed 0.61 0.61 −0.01 (0.84)
Akan ethnicity 0.30 0.41 0.11 (0.00)
Ewe ethnicity 0.19 0.26 0.07 (0.05)
Ga ethnicity 0.13 0.15 0.02 (0.36)
Female 0.67 0.65 −0.02 (0.61)
More than secondary school 0.21 0.26 0.05 (0.12)
Wave 2 0.47 0.45 −0.02 (0.65)
Monthly income, GHS 306.05 317.48 11.42 (0.59)
Prays multiple times per day 0.86 0.91 0.05 (0.02)
Top quartile church giving 0.21 0.26 0.05 (0.14)
Church more than once a week 0.74 0.74 0.00 (0.97)
Believes God involved in finances 0.94 0.96 0.02 (0.24)
Travels more than one hour to church 0.09 0.08 −0.01 (0.76)
Note P-values reported in parentheses are from a t-test of equality of means. Comparisons of pre-registered
covariates and some additional variables describing church and spiritual behaviour
in the middle of a revival week.32 We do not find them to be different from members recruited during
regular service weeks for most measures of religious behaviour or demographics (see Table 5). How-
ever, for this sample, we find important differences in treatment effects. In both wave 1, wave 2, and
the pooled results, we find that after being enrolled in insurance, they increased giving to the church.
The coefficient on the interaction of the enrolment and the revival week is positive and large (around
three to four times the main treatment effect in absolute value), and significant. These results for the
total sample are displayed in Table 23 in Appendix C.
Without random assignment for participation we do not know if this effect is due to different
types of church members showing up (a selection effect), or a change in behavior due to the revival
week itself. In Table 6, we present the results of the experiment we conducted in wave 2 where we
randomized assignment to participate in the study during revival weeks. At the time of recruitment,
participants were assigned to attend the experiment in a fixed week. They were not given any further
incentives to participate during their assigned week. There was low compliance particularly amongst
32The number of church members sampled during revival weeks was lower than the number suggested by power
calculations in the wave 2 pre-analysis plan. We attempted to maximize the number of revival week participants by
scheduling data collection in a period that overlapped with a number of churches’ revival weeks. However, recruitment
and randomization into revival weeks was ultimately limited because most churches only hold 3-4 revival events per
year, some of which are ad-hoc and need-based, and we did not have continuous access to the churches throughout
the year. For one church, we recruited church members only during the revival week and were not able to randomize
participation.
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Table 6: Effects of attending the experiment during a revival week for the subset of Wave 2 participants
where the assigned participation date was randomised with an encouragement design.
Dependent variable:
giving to the church giving to the street giving to thanksgiving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Non-randomised revival attendance,
insurance enrollment −0.047 −0.069∗∗∗ −0.051 −0.067∗∗ −0.017 −0.017
(0.039) (0.025) (0.040) (0.031) (0.033) (0.022)
revival week −0.080 −0.072∗ −0.041 −0.013 −0.038 0.024
(0.050) (0.043) (0.056) (0.054) (0.043) (0.036)
insurance enrollment x
revival week
0.181∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.110 0.149∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.059) (0.068) (0.056) (0.055) (0.053)
constant 0.571∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.093) (0.029) (0.109) (0.023) (0.111)
N 241 241 242 242 241 241
Panel B: Intention-to-treat estimates of random assignment to participate during a revival
week
insurance enrollment −0.058 −0.069∗∗ −0.073∗ −0.084∗∗ −0.024 −0.025
(0.040) (0.028) (0.041) (0.037) (0.035) (0.027)
assigned to revival −0.061 −0.052 −0.066 −0.048 −0.058 −0.048
(0.038) (0.034) (0.046) (0.047) (0.040) (0.039)
insurance enrollment x
assigned to revival
0.139∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.128∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.085∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.056) (0.053) (0.066) (0.063) (0.051) (0.050)
constant 0.581∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.102) (0.029) (0.111) (0.025) (0.117)
N 241 241 242 242 241 241
Panel C: Instrumental variables estimate of revival week using randomised assignment to
a revival week as an instrument for attending during a revival week,
insurance enrollment −0.072∗∗ −0.084∗∗ −0.078∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.031 −0.035
(0.036) (0.035) (0.041) (0.042) (0.038) (0.039)
revival week −0.157∗ −0.143 −0.157 −0.119 −0.149 −0.137
(0.094) (0.104) (0.107) (0.123) (0.098) (0.114)
insurance enrollment x
revival week
0.314∗∗ 0.322∗∗ 0.268∗ 0.297∗∗ 0.201 0.229
(0.132) (0.129) (0.147) (0.150) (0.138) (0.142)
constant 0.587∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.113) (0.030) (0.134) (0.028) (0.124)
N 241 241 242 242 241 241
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Church dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table corresponds to ‘Heterogenous Effect 2’ in the pre-analysis plan. Tobit
regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates and are clustered at the session
level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church
(columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event
called the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the
endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income),
an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a
dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because a computer error led to some
missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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those who were assigned to revival weeks (see Table 24 in Appendix C) although compliers do not dif-
fer from non-compliers in terms of pre-registered demographics (see Tables 5 and 27 in Appendix C).
As a result, we report both intention-to-treat and instrumented estimates of the effect of randomized
revival attendance.
In Table 6, we show results for wave 2 participants who were part of the revival experiment (i.e.
their church held a revival week during data collection and they received a randomized assignment
to attend the experiment during a fixed week). In Panel A, we present results for participants who
attended the experiment during a revival week, regardless of when they were randomly assigned.
Church members who participated in the experiment during the revival week gave significantly more
to all recipients when they received the insurance than those who participated during normal church
weeks. In Panel B, we use the random assignment to the revival week rather than actual participation
and find the same significant and positive effects. Finally, in Panel C, participation during revival
week is instrumented with assignment.33 We find even stronger positive effects of the revival week.
Indeed, in this specification, the treatment effect of insurance enrollment on donations to the church
and the street children’s fund in normal weeks is stronger and has higher statistical significance than
the effect reported for wave 2 alone in Table 3.
Referring back to the model, these results are consistent with interpreting the revival week as an
upwards shift of θ, the relative weight in our subjects’ utility function of church activities compared
to secular ones. As equation (38) in the Appendix demonstrates, when equilibrium giving is higher
than a given threshold, even in the presence of spiritual insurance, church members respond to an
exogenous shock increasing the size of a loss by a decrease in optimal giving. Intuitively, there is a
point at which members have already given so much money to the church, that when faced with the
prospect of a negative income shock, they prefer to keep money to smooth secular consumption (i.e.,
when g∗ is large, the income effect dominates the substitution effect).
This explanation of the revival week effect is consistent with the types of activities and benefits
members are supposed to derive from revival weeks. The results highlight that the spiritual state
of church members (captured by θ in the model) matters. Intensive religious participation seems to
33F-statistics from the first stage reported in Table 28.
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decrease the demand for spiritual insurance and one might derive that overall demand for insurance,
formal or informal, is low during important religious events when individuals already “feel protected”.
5.5.3 Exploratory heterogeneity analysis: costly participation and different uses of the
church
The previous section highlights that there can be important heterogeneity in the treatment effect due
to a temporary shift in θ, the relative weight the individual puts on church activities compared to
secular consumption, during revival weeks. However, there can be heterogeneity between individuals
in how they value spiritual consumption over secular consumption for a number of other reasons.
While measuring θ directly is difficult, our questionnaire includes questions that measure church in-
volvement and religious beliefs. We can use them to explore alternative reasons that θ might differ
between individuals, and how these differences in θ interact with our main treatment effects.
To avoid selectively presenting interactions of different variables, we take all the survey questions
that asked participants about their church participation to create an index that captures costly church
behavior: questions that measure how much time and money participants give up to participate in
the church (see Table 14 in Appendix A for descriptive statistics of responses to these questions).34
We code responses to the questions as dummy variables, and then combine all the dummy variables
into an index, taking the mean of all variables weighted by the inverse of their covariance matrix as
proposed by Anderson (2008). Details of the construction of the index are provided in Appendix C.
The variation of the index is pictured in Figure 3.
We expect the costly behavior index to have a similar effect as participation during a revival week.
The intuition from our model is the same: a higher value of spiritual consumption relative to secular
consumption (high θ) leads to higher levels of costly church participation. Such high values of spiritual
consumption can reach a point where members feel sufficiently protected that the income effect of the
insurance enrollment outweighs the substitution effect.
The interaction between the insurance enrollment treatment and the costly participation index is
34The interaction between the treatment and an indicator for donating a lot defined as being in the top 25 percent of
givers relative to own income was pre-registered in wave 2. The results separately are displayed in tables 32 - 34 column
2.
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displayed in Table 29 in Appendix C. In line with the previous section, we find that members that
score highly on the religious participation index have treatment effects that are significantly different
from those with lower participation levels. While lower levels of costly participation are associated
with decreasing giving to the church after enrollment in insurance, this is not the case for members
with higher levels of costly participation.
Another level of potential heterogeneity is that church members differ in the the type of insurance
they demand. The average treatment effect of the experiment does not imply that all church members
are seeking spiritual insurance. Indeed, it is a weighted average of the effect of church members who
are seeking spiritual insurance and church members who seek community or no insurance. Using the
survey questionnaire, we try to disentangle different types of church members. As before, we use all
questions in the questionnaire that asked about beliefs or uses of the church for financial purposes or
as a social network (Table 8 in Appendix A) and questions that asked for beliefs or uses of the church
as a center for spiritual activity (see Table 15 in Appendix A for summary statistics). We create the
two indices with the same method as the costly participation index. Their variation and correlations
are displayed in the same Figure 3.
Figure 3 shows that most church members state spiritual reasons for going to church and there is
little variation in the index (see Appendix C for a longer discussion of this). The index for using the
church as a financial and social network has more variation and a majority of church members score
relatively low on this measure. Tables 30 and 31 in Appendix C present results for the interactions
between the insurance enrollment treatment and the ways participants report using the church.35 We
do not find that church members with high values in the spiritual motive index react differently to
the treatment. On the contrary, those who score high on the network index give significantly less to
their own church and the street children’s fund after being enrolled in insurance. These results are
consistent with both community-based insurance and spiritual insurance (represented by the decrease
in giving to the street children’s fund).
These results illustrate that while we can identify differences in the intensity of costly behavior (a
proxy for the level of θ), we are not able to cleanly identify differences between church members in
35Tables 32 to 40 in Appendix C provide more detailed regressions with individual questionnaire answers as indepen-
dent regressors.
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the type of insurance they seek. Indeed, the lack of variation in the spiritual index shows that most
church members seek at least some spiritual or moral dimension in their churches.
6 Conclusion
We conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment with church members from an established Pentecostal
church in Accra, Ghana. We find evidence for religious and charitable giving being part of a church
member’s risk-coping strategy. This spiritual insurance channel does not contradict the possibility
that other church community-based mechanisms exist in parallel. Indeed, survey responses from
church members and leaders emphasize the important role the church plays as a financial contributor.
However, our experimental findings add nuance to the literature on religious institutions as coordinat-
ing platforms by demonstrating that adherents might care at least as much about spiritual insurance
(affecting outcomes through signalling to an interventionist God) as they do about material insurance
(accessing transfers of goods and services from other church members).
The treatment effects obtained within the church population depend on three important factors.
First, Pentecostal churches stress the involvement of God in terms of blessings in everyday life and
teach about God rewarding religious and charitable giving. This particular religious discourse makes
members of these churches more prone to see charitable behaviour as a means to decrease the risk of
bad events happening and to increase the occurrence of good events. Second, trust in the insurance
is fundamental, especially in a context where formal institutions are generally weak. In our case,
the church was used as a coordinator for the insurance scheme and participants seemed to trust the
insurance because it was coordinated by their pastor.36 Finally, our results obviously depend on the
absence (or limited presence) of better institutions to deal with risk. As long as these three conditions
are met we expect our results to hold. In particular we believe that our results would hold in other
Pentecostal churches and settings where the development of formal insurance is low. Since beliefs in
religious rituals that influence immediate events are common among a variety of religions and faiths
in developing countries, it would be interesting to reproduce the experiment in a different religious
setting.
36By contrast when we tried to run a similar experiment with the market association, the insurance enrollment failed
to yield any effect because market participants did not trust the head of the market association who was chosen to
administrate the insurance scheme.
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The experiment stressed the importance of religion for economic decisions made by individuals in
a setting with weak formal institutions. While individuals might belong to religious institutions in
those settings because they offer risk-mitigating strategies, we show that formal, private insurance
can at least partially substitute for spiritual based insurance mechanisms. Since the church was used
as a credible coordinator for the insurance scheme, we are inclined to see religious institutions in this
context as opportunities to spread formal insurance rather than as an obstacle to its development.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A: Additional descriptive statistics of the experiment and
participants
Table 7: The social role of the church
Is it important for you that your close friends come from the same church as you?
Yes, I try to only make friends with people from my church 0.17
Yes, I try to seek people from my church but it is not so important 0.36
No, it is not important at all 0.43









Formal financial services (bank, microfinance, etc.) 0.03
Formal social services (government or NGO 0.00










Formal financial services (bank, microfinance, etc.) 0.01
Formal social services (government or NGO 0.01
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Table 8: The financial role of the church
Do you work or do business with people from the same church as you?
Yes, I only work or do business with people from my church 0.09
Yes, I try to do business with people from my church but it is not so important 0.33
No, I prefer not to work or do business with people from my church 0.01
No, it is not important at all 0.52




Formal financial services (bank, microfinance, etc.) 0.16
No one 0.11
Formal social services (government or NGO 0.05
Other 0.04
Work superior 0.03
How is God involved in your finances?
God blesses me with financial abundance 0.30
God is not interested in my finances 0.00
God leaves me to run my own financial affairs 0.01
God provides enough that I do not suffer 0.64




Table 9: Summary statistics of interviewed church branches
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Year Founded 1990.3 6.651 1972 1994 10
Number of church members (approx.) 775.818 771.593 300 2500 11
Church members have an education level lower than average 45.5% 11
Church members have income higher than average 45.5% 11
Average number attending Sunday service 487.273 458.892 150 1500 11
Average amount received on a Sunday 487.273 458.892 150 1500 11
The church owns its building 90.9% 11
The church owns other properties 9.1% 11
Number of paid staff 6.273 3.036 1 13 11
The church has a welfare fund 100% 11
Note: All main churches were contacted for interviews However, due to scheduling conflicts we were
not able to meet the senior pastors of three main churches to conduct the interviews. Information
about each individual church branch can be found in Table 10 in the Appendix.
Table 10: Information on interviewed church branches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Year founded 1988 1993 1994 1993 1972 1993 1992 1994 1992 1992 .
Number of church members (approx.) 2500 300 500 500 2114 300 450 700 350 300 520
Church members’ education compared to average Higher Lower Average Lower Higher Lower Lower Lower Average Average Average
Church members’ income compared to average Average Average Average Lower Higher Lower Lower Lower Average Average Lower
Average number attending Sunday service 1500 250 200 300 1260 150 250 500 200 250 500
Average amount received on a Sunday . 2000 . 300 . . 300 1200 600 475 900
The church owns its building Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The church owns other properties No No No No Yes No No No No No No
Number of paid staff 8 4 6 8 13 1 4 7 5 6 7
The church has a welfare fund Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 11: Number of people participating across insurance and revival treatments and two waves of
data collection
Wave Revival Insurance Insurance Information No Insurance Wave totals Revival Total
1 1 38 50 34 122 221
2 1 40 39 20 99
1 0 165 120 169 454 849
2 0 136 117 142 395
379 326 365 1070
Table 12: Pre-registed covariates compared across waves.
Summary of covariates across waves.
Variable Wave 1 Wave 2 Difference (p-value) Ghana census 2010
Age 35.77 38.47 2.70 (0.00) 36.49
Female 0.61 0.73 0.12 (0.00) 0.52
Monthly income, GHS 359.11 254.14 −104.97 (0.00)
Employed 0.56 0.68 0.12 (0.00) 0.69
More than secondary school 0.28 0.15 −0.13 (0.00)
Akan ethnicity 0.42 0.21 −0.21 (0.00) 0.39
Ewe ethnicity 0.21 0.19 −0.02 (0.46) 0.20
Ga ethnicity 0.15 0.11 −0.03 (0.10) 0.25
Attends church daily 0.08 0.01 −0.06 (0.00)
Prays multiple times per day 0.84 0.91 0.07 (0.00)
Attended during revival week 0.21 0.20 −0.01 (0.65)
Note P-values reported in parentheses are from a t-test of equality of means. ‘Ghana census 2010’ column
reflects data for census population above the age of 18 living in the Greater Accra region.
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Table 13: Mean values of additional demographic variables that were not pre-registered
Variable wave = 1 wave = 2 Difference (p-value)
Is married 0.40 0.47 0.07 (0.03)
Has always belonged to this church 0.00 0.44 0.44 (0.00)
Registered for National Health Insurance 0.33 0.85 0.52 (0.00)
Has any other sort of insurance 0.18 0.10 −0.08 (0.00)
Met or will meet spouse in church 0.43 0.34 −0.09 (0.01)
Note P-values reported in parentheses are from a t-test of equality of means.
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Table 14: Costly religious behaviour
Share of income given to the church each month, excluding tithes.
Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max
0.00 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 1.25
How many times per week or per year do you attend your church?
Daily 0.05
More than once per week 0.74
Weekly 0.15
A few times per month 0.01
A few times per year 0.00
Less than once a year 0.00
How many hours do you travel to attend your regular church?
30 minutes to 1 hour 0.43
Less than 30 minutes 0.45
More than 1 hour 0.08
Have you moved your place of residence in order to be closer to your church?
Yes 0.09
No 0.87
Have you changed the food you eat or drink for religious reasons
Yes 0.35
No 0.61
Have you ever gone into debt to pay a church debt?
Yes 0.21
No 0.75
In the last 6 weeks, have you engaged in any of the following activities to bring others to your church?
(Select all that apply)
Inviting friends or family to church 0.62
Praying for others to attend church 0.44
Preaching or teaching outsidethe church 0.33
Distributing church material 0.15
Preaching or teaching in the church 0.11
public speaking 0.02
Are you engaged in any of the following ministries of your church? (Select all that apply)
Men, women, or youth fellowship 0.74
Home fellowship 0.28
Choir, praise and worship 0.21
Prayer ministry 0.15
Ushering or protocol 0.10
Outreach ministry 0.09
Children’s ministry 0.04
Pastoring or deacon 0.02
Number of church ministries, and proportion of participants enagaged in that
number of ministries
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.12 0.42 0.27 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.00
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Table 15: Religious beliefs and attitudes
What are the main reasons you are with your current church?
The teaching about God corresponds to what I believe in 0.87
I go for the moral guidance to me and my family 0.52
I like the atmosphere of the services 0.32
Friends or relatives brought me there 0.30
Other members made an effort to welcome me 0.17
The congregation contains many interesting and successful people 0.12
I hope to meet a good marriage partner for me or my children 0.11
The building is close to my home 0.06
The facilities are comfortable (e.g. air-conditioning, comfortable seating, etc.) 0.05
Does giving to charity serve the same spiritual duty as giving directly to the church?
I do not think I have a duty to either. 0.00
No, charity is less important 0.10
No, charity is more important 0.25
Yes, they are equally important 0.61
Within the last 2 years, have you ever attended a prayer camp either for yourself or on behalf of a
friend or family member?
Yes 0.36
No 0.60




8 Appendix B: Additional analysis of choice data and alter-
native specifications

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Insurance enrollment compared to insurance information, N = 504
insurance enrollment −0.056∗∗ −0.036 0.027 −0.012 0.010
(0.022) (0.025) (0.035) (0.019) (0.022)
constant 0.648∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.096) (0.133) (0.062) (0.083)
N 504 504 504 504 504
Panel B: Insurance information compared to no insurance, N = 519
insurance information 0.032 0.001 −0.018 0.006 0.008
(0.022) (0.023) (0.034) (0.020) (0.018)
constant 0.627∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.084) (0.132) (0.075) (0.070)
N 519 519 519 519 519
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses
below the estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment
that a participant allocated considering non-anonymous giving to the church. The endowment in Wave 1 was 11
GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity,
employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times per day,
church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave.
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Table 17: Effects of insurance enrollment compared to receiving nothing for participants in weeks with
no revival weekevents
Dependent variable:
giving to the church giving to the street giving to thanksgiving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Pooled
insurance enrollment −0.025 −0.017 −0.025 −0.020 −0.037∗ −0.027
(0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018)
constant 0.465∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.088) (0.019) (0.111) (0.016) (0.074)
N 612 575 612 575 612 575
Panel B: Wave 1 only
insurance enrollment −0.011 −0.015 0.008 0.002 −0.014 −0.017
(0.035) (0.026) (0.034) (0.030) (0.032) (0.027)
constant 0.459∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.171) (0.024) (0.163) (0.018) (0.145)
N 334 297 334 297 334 297
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Panel C: Wave 2 only
insurance enrollment −0.040 −0.027 −0.058∗ −0.042 −0.063∗∗ −0.040∗
(0.030) (0.024) (0.033) (0.028) (0.027) (0.021)
constant 0.582∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.106) (0.016) (0.127) (0.015) (0.091)
N 278 278 278 278 278 278
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Church dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table corresponds to ’Secondary Test 1’ in the pre-analysis
plan. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates and
are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment a participant
allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children
(columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5
and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in
2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily
church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy
for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because a computer error led
to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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Panel A: Insurance enrollment compared to insurance information, N = 504
insurance enrollment −0.027∗ −0.003 −0.022
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
constant 0.532∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.067) (0.066)
N 504 504 504
Panel B: Insurance information compared to no insurance, N = 519
insurance information −0.014 −0.011 0.014
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
constant 0.453∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.051) (0.050)
N 519 519 519
Individual controls YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in
parentheses below the estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction
of the endowment that a participant allocated between the different outcomes. The endowment in Wave
1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include
age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator
for praying multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave.
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Table 19: Effects of insurance enrollment compared to insurance information with standardized out-
comes.
Dependent variable:
giving to the church giving to the street giving to thanksgiving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Wave 1
insurance enrollment −0.317∗∗ −0.248∗ −0.280∗∗ −0.285∗∗ −0.257∗ −0.228
(0.124) (0.129) (0.120) (0.132) (0.138) (0.147)
constant −0.180∗∗ −0.015 −0.028 0.123 −0.216∗∗ 0.487
(0.089) (0.488) (0.089) (0.491) (0.103) (0.536)
N 285 251 285 251 285 251
Panel B: Wave 2
insurance enrollment −0.164 −0.187∗ −0.179 −0.177 −0.074 −0.025
(0.106) (0.104) (0.119) (0.122) (0.112) (0.112)
constant 0.381∗∗∗ −0.071 0.206∗∗ −0.747∗ 0.335∗∗∗ −0.676
(0.077) (0.370) (0.089) (0.415) (0.083) (0.450)
N 253 253 253 253 253 253
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Church dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in
parentheses below the estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is standardized
cedi amounts (standardized with respect to the wave mean and standard deviation) that a participant
allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children
(columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5
and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in
2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily
church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy
for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because a computer error led
to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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Table 20: Effects of insurance information compared to no insurance with standardized outcomes.
Dependent variable:
giving to the church giving to the street giving to thanksgiving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Wave 1
insurance information 0.206∗ 0.180 0.272∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.176 0.156
(0.114) (0.117) (0.118) (0.130) (0.122) (0.132)
constant −0.396∗∗∗ −0.134 −0.304∗∗∗ −0.224 −0.409∗∗∗ 0.154
(0.074) (0.408) (0.076) (0.444) (0.074) (0.467)
N 289 260 289 260 289 260
Panel B: Wave 2
insurance information −0.005 0.039 −0.053 −0.056 −0.181∗ −0.140
(0.098) (0.092) (0.111) (0.110) (0.106) (0.100)
constant 0.386∗∗∗ 0.728∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.378 0.516∗∗∗ 0.546
(0.061) (0.384) (0.066) (0.418) (0.065) (0.412)
N 259 259 259 259 259 259
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Church dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in
parentheses below the estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is standardized
cedi amounts (standardized with respect to the wave mean and standard deviation) that a participant
allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children
(columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5
and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in
2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily
church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy
for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because a computer error led
to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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Table 21: Effects of insurance enrollment compared to insurance information using cedi outcomes,
separated by wave.
Dependent variable:
giving to the church giving to the street giving to thanksgiving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Wave 1, 2015 cedi value
insurance enrollment −0.915∗ −0.709∗ −0.926∗∗ −0.974∗∗ −0.930∗ −0.957∗
(0.471) (0.403) (0.434) (0.465) (0.502) (0.504)
constant 5.846∗∗∗ 6.308∗∗∗ 6.227∗∗∗ 6.171∗∗∗ 5.703∗∗∗ 7.665∗∗∗
(0.385) (1.433) (0.377) (1.523) (0.408) (1.540)
N 285 251 285 251 285 251
Panel B: Wave 2, 2019 cedi value (approximately 1.6 x 2015 cedi value)
insurance enrollment −0.738 −0.840∗ −0.854 −0.876 −0.347 −0.141
(0.695) (0.481) (0.756) (0.599) (0.603) (0.404)
constant 11.039∗∗∗ 9.177∗∗∗ 10.141∗∗∗ 5.950∗∗∗ 10.885∗∗∗ 6.321∗∗∗
(0.479) (1.727) (0.511) (2.062) (0.416) (1.859)
N 253 253 253 253 253 253
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Church dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in
parentheses below the estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the cedi
amount (unadjusted for inflation) that a participant allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and
2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event
called the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS
in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender
ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying
multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the
sample changes across columns because a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in
wave 1.
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Table 22: Effects of receiving insurance information compared to receiving nothing using cedi out-
comes, separated by wave.
Dependent variable:
giving to the church giving to the street giving to thanksgiving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Wave 1, 2015 cedi value
insurance information 0.778∗ 0.752∗ 1.004∗∗ 1.040∗∗ 0.746∗ 0.668
(0.450) (0.412) (0.457) (0.476) (0.448) (0.408)
constant 5.045∗∗∗ 6.008∗∗∗ 5.220∗∗∗ 5.137∗∗∗ 4.937∗∗∗ 6.570∗∗∗
(0.256) (1.500) (0.266) (1.580) (0.204) (1.516)
N 289 260 289 260 289 260
Panel B: Wave 2, 2019 cedi value (approximately 1.6 x 2015 cedi value)
insurance information −0.026 0.165 −0.259 −0.276 −0.849∗ −0.654∗
(0.557) (0.423) (0.591) (0.527) (0.513) (0.376)
constant 11.064∗∗∗ 12.614∗∗∗ 10.408∗∗∗ 11.143∗∗∗ 11.735∗∗∗ 11.840∗∗∗
(0.271) (2.273) (0.295) (2.142) (0.291) (2.159)
N 259 259 259 259 259 259
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Church dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses
below the estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the cedi amount (unadjusted
for inflation) that a participant allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity
working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day of
thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in
Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an
indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times per day, church fixed effects,
and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because a computer
error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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9 Appendix C: Heterogeneity of the main treatment effects
9.1 Revival week results
9.1.1 Pooled sample revival week results
Table 23: Effects of insurance enrollment and insurance information with a dummy for participation
during revival week
Dependent variable:
giving to the church giving to the street giving to thanksgiving
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Revival effects, insurance enrollment compared to insurance information
insurance enrollment −0.064∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.055∗ −0.055∗∗
(0.030) (0.023) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026)
revival week −0.144∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.032) (0.045) (0.046)
insurance enrollment x
revival week
0.242∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.048) (0.047) (0.042) (0.058) (0.045)
constant 0.555∗∗∗ 0.625∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.080) (0.021) (0.075) (0.022) (0.071)
N 704 667 705 668 704 667
Panel B: Revival effects Insurance information compared to nothing
insurance information 0.038 0.039∗ 0.039 0.040 0.016 0.016
(0.028) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.022)
revival week 0.024 0.031 −0.002 −0.039 −0.032 −0.046
(0.055) (0.048) (0.044) (0.048) (0.060) (0.059)
insurance information x
revival week
−0.166∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.102 −0.104
(0.067) (0.057) (0.057) (0.052) (0.076) (0.067)
constant 0.516∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.076) (0.015) (0.072) (0.018) (0.072)
N 690 659 690 659 690 659
Individual controls NO YES NO YES NO YES
Church dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table corresponds to ‘Heterogenous Effect 1’ in the pre-analysis plan. Tobit regressions
censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent
variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit
charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day of thanksgiving
(columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual
controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying
multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns
because a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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9.1.2 Wave 2 revival week experiment
Table 24: Recruitment and assignment of revival participation in Wave 2
Total recruited in Wave 2 494
Number randomly assigned to attend the experiment regular week revival week total
255 114 369
Proportion complying with treatment assignment 0.95 0.39
Table 25: Balance amongst randomly assigned revival participants
Variable Revival = 0 Revival = 1 Difference (p-value)
Age 40.52 38.38 2.13 (0.28)
Attends church daily 0.02 0.02 0.00 (0.95)
Employed 0.69 0.68 0.00 (0.94)
Akan ethnicity 0.38 0.16 0.22 (0.00)
Ewe ethnicity 0.29 0.17 0.13 (0.05)
Ga ethnicity 0.24 0.08 0.16 (0.01)
Female 0.74 0.74 0.00 (0.98)
More than secondary school 0.09 0.17 −0.09 (0.04)
Monthly income, GHS 257.61 255.60 2.00 (0.94)
Prays multiple times per day 0.88 0.92 −0.04 (0.34)
Top quartile church giving 0.31 0.15 0.16 (0.02)
Church more than once a week 0.79 0.87 −0.08 (0.16)
Believes God involved in finances 0.93 0.99 −0.06 (0.11)
Travels more than one hour to church 0.03 0.07 −0.04 (0.20)
Table 26: Comparing participants who complied with revival week treatment assignment: assigned to
revival and complied compared to assigned to regular week and complied.
Variable Revival = 0 Revival = 1 Difference (p-value)
Age 41.04 38.35 2.70 (0.25)
Attends church daily 0.02 0.02 0.01 (0.81)
Employed 0.69 0.69 0.00 (0.96)
Akan ethnicity 0.42 0.15 0.28 (0.00)
Ewe ethnicity 0.29 0.18 0.11 (0.13)
Ga ethnicity 0.20 0.10 0.10 (0.10)
Female 0.71 0.73 −0.02 (0.80)
More than secondary school 0.09 0.21 −0.12 (0.02)
Monthly income, GHS 273.25 271.51 1.74 (0.96)
Prays multiple times per day 0.89 0.94 −0.05 (0.33)
Top quartile church giving 0.30 0.15 0.15 (0.05)
Church more than once a week 0.80 0.87 −0.07 (0.30)
Believes God involved in finances 0.93 0.98 −0.05 (0.20)
Travels more than one hour to church 0.04 0.07 −0.03 (0.40)
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Table 27: Comparing participants who complied with treatment assignment to participants who did
not comply with treatment assignment.
Variable Complier = 0 Not complier = 1 Difference (p-value)
Age 38.53 38.77 0.24 (0.88)
Attends church daily 0.01 0.02 0.01 (0.71)
Employed 0.66 0.69 0.03 (0.62)
Akan ethnicity 0.20 0.19 −0.02 (0.75)
Ewe ethnicity 0.16 0.20 0.04 (0.40)
Ga ethnicity 0.10 0.11 0.02 (0.68)
Female 0.78 0.73 −0.06 (0.29)
More than secondary school 0.06 0.19 0.13 (0.00)
Monthly income, GHS 201.26 271.78 70.52 (0.00)
Prays multiple times per day 0.87 0.93 0.06 (0.12)
Top quartile church giving 0.17 0.17 0.01 (0.88)
Church more than once a week 0.88 0.86 −0.02 (0.58)
Believes God involved in finances 0.99 0.98 −0.01 (0.41)
Travels more than one hour to church 0.05 0.07 0.02 (0.44)
Table 28: F-statistics for weak instrument tests for first stage reported in Table 6
no controls with controls
revival x insurance 38.33 31.42
revival 37.96 29.62
9.1.3 Exploratory results on heterogeneity by church behaviour and reported attitudes
Creation of the indexes We create an index that measures costly church participation. The index
sums the following indicators: An indicator for the members that give most as a proportion of their
income37, if they have borrowed money for a church pledge, if they restrict their food or alcohol
consumption for religious reasons, if they travel for more than one hour to reach the church, if they
have moved to be closer to the church and if they attend church on a weekly basis. The index is then
weighted by the inverse of the covariance matrix of the individuals indicators (as in Anderson (2008)).
The left upper panel in Figure 3 shows the distribution of the summary index for costly church par-
ticipation. Most members fulfill one or two of the criteria, but there is variation toward the upper tail.
Using the survey questionnaire, we try to disentangle different types of church members. We cre-
ate an index to measure if church members go to the church for spiritual reasons. We also create a
summary index that measures if church members put an emphasis on the church community and the
financial services they offer. The spiritual motives index sums weighted indicators for church reason
37Stated church donations are divided be their income and church members that fall into the highest quartile are
defined as high givers. The quartiles are defined by wave.
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that we define as spiritual38, if they believe that God is involved in their finances39, if they believe
in a spiritual element in the last death in their family and if they had lately attended a prayer camp
(where people pray for a specific occasion).
For the index that measures the usage of the church community as a finance-related network, we
use weighted indicators if the church members has already received financial assistance, if they would
go to the church community if they had financial problems, if they prefer to do business and make
friends with church members and if they state community-related reasons to go to church40.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note Index variables created out of questionnaire data. Responses to all questions were categorized into one of three
groups: the extent of costly (time or money) participation in church activities, and two indexes indicating whether the
participant used the church for i. spiritual needs and ii. as a financial or social network. The figure shows correlations
between the index variables (visually in the lower panels and in numbers in the upper panels), as well as the distributions
of each index for the total sample along the diagonal.
38If respondents declare in question 31 that one of the reason they go to their current church is ”The teaching about
God corresponds to what I believe in” and ”I go for the moral guidance to me and my family”.
39Question 52, response ”God provides enough that I do not suffer” or ”God blesses me with financial abundance”.
40If respondents declare in question 31 that one of the reason they go to their current church is ”Other members
made an effort to welcome me” and ”The congregation contains many interesting and successful people”.
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insurance enrollment −0.128∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.054) (0.042)






constant 0.709∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.109) (0.097)
N 470 470 470
Individual controls YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are
in parentheses below the estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the
fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a
nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called
the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015
and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity,
employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple
times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave.
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insurance enrollment −0.139 −0.113 −0.168
(0.149) (0.215) (0.186)






constant 0.815∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.221) (0.188)
N 490 490 490
Individual controls YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are
in parentheses below the estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the
fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a
nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called
the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015
and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity,
employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple
times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave.
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insurance enrollment −0.013 −0.025 −0.062∗
(0.031) (0.036) (0.032)






constant 0.642∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.079) (0.085)
N 503 503 503
Individual controls YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are
in parentheses below the estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the
fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a
nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called
the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015
and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity,
employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple
times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave.
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Table 32: Costly Behaviour: keep versus church
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
insurance enrollment −0.128∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.046 −0.048∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗



















changed food drink religious 0.032
(0.036)
insurance enrollment x
changed food drink religious
−0.026
(0.055)
travels more than hour 0.052
(0.078)
insurance enrollment x
travels more than hour
−0.088
(0.100)
took debt for church −0.023
(0.037)
insurance enrollment x
took debt for church
0.057
(0.052)






constant 0.709∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.106) (0.086) (0.080) (0.080) (0.077) (0.076)
N 470 471 504 502 503 503 503
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates and are
clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church
(columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day
of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019.
Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying
multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because
a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
69
Table 33: Costly Behaviour: keep versus street
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
insurance enrollment −0.127∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.057 −0.077∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗



















changed food drink religious −0.014
(0.037)
insurance enrollment x
changed food drink religious
0.019
(0.052)
travels more than hour 0.024
(0.074)
insurance enrollment x
travels more than hour
−0.018
(0.094)
took debt for church −0.007
(0.045)
insurance enrollment x
took debt for church
0.092
(0.064)






constant 0.638∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.123) (0.098) (0.083) (0.080) (0.080) (0.078)
N 470 471 504 502 503 503 503
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates and are
clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church
(columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day
of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019.
Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying
multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because
a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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Table 34: Costly Behaviour: keep versus thanks
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
insurance enrollment −0.116∗∗∗ −0.043 −0.082 −0.069∗ −0.046∗ −0.063∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗



















changed food drink religious −0.014
(0.039)
insurance enrollment x
changed food drink religious
0.045
(0.059)
travels more than hour 0.066
(0.067)
insurance enrollment x
travels more than hour
−0.073
(0.094)
took debt for church −0.039
(0.040)
insurance enrollment x
took debt for church
0.049
(0.060)






constant 0.710∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.119) (0.085) (0.087) (0.083) (0.082) (0.077)
N 470 471 504 502 503 503 503
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates and are
clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church
(columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day
of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019.
Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying
multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because
a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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Table 35: Use Church Spiritually: keep versus church
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insurance enrollment −0.139 −0.020 −0.022 −0.062∗∗ −0.054 −0.075∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.067) (0.032) (0.025) (0.060) (0.026)












church reasons moral guidance 0.008
(0.023)
insurance enrollment x
church reasons moral guidance
−0.064
(0.041)






believes god involved in finances 0.004
(0.036)
insurance enrollment x









constant 0.815∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.091) (0.077) (0.082) (0.075) (0.079)
N 490 504 504 490 504 503
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the
estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant
allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and
4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave
1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender
ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times
per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns
because a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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Table 36: Use Church Spiritually: keep versus street
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insurance enrollment −0.113 −0.092 −0.054 −0.070∗∗ −0.141 −0.074∗∗
(0.215) (0.088) (0.040) (0.031) (0.096) (0.031)












church reasons moral guidance −0.010
(0.041)
insurance enrollment x
church reasons moral guidance
−0.029
(0.051)






believes god involved in finances −0.054
(0.047)
insurance enrollment x









constant 0.630∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.102) (0.082) (0.080) (0.087) (0.083)
N 490 504 504 490 504 503
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the
estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant
allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and
4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave
1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender
ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times
per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns
because a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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Table 37: Use Church Spiritually: keep versus thanks
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
insurance enrollment −0.168 −0.115 −0.035 −0.045 −0.076 −0.080∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.085) (0.035) (0.028) (0.067) (0.027)












church reasons moral guidance 0.006
(0.035)
insurance enrollment x
church reasons moral guidance
−0.032
(0.049)






believes god involved in finances −0.041
(0.032)
insurance enrollment x









constant 0.738∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.098) (0.083) (0.087) (0.089) (0.081)
N 490 504 504 490 504 503
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the
estimates and are clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant
allocated to either their own church (columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and
4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave
1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019. Individual controls include age, gender
ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying multiple times
per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns
because a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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Table 38: Use Church Network: keep versus church
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
insurance enrollment −0.013 −0.048∗∗ −0.035 −0.045∗ −0.049∗ −0.052∗∗ −0.042∗
(0.031) (0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.022) (0.025)






help financial church community −0.006
(0.035)
insurance enrollment x
help financial church community
−0.038
(0.053)












makes friends in church −0.024
(0.042)
insurance enrollment x
makes friends in church
−0.032
(0.065)
church reasons welcoming members 0.014
(0.039)
insurance enrollment x
church reasons welcoming members
−0.021
(0.054)
church reasons interesting congregation 0.085∗
(0.048)
insurance enrollment x
church reasons interesting congregation
−0.106
(0.065)
constant 0.642∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.077) (0.081) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.076)
N 503 504 504 503 504 504 504
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates and are
clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church
(columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day
of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019.
Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying
multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because
a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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Table 39: Use Church Network: keep versus street
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
insurance enrollment −0.025 −0.055∗∗ −0.052 −0.052∗ −0.048 −0.072∗∗ −0.069∗∗
(0.036) (0.028) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)






help financial church community 0.007
(0.046)
insurance enrollment x
help financial church community
−0.069
(0.056)












makes friends in church 0.025
(0.045)
insurance enrollment x
makes friends in church
−0.117∗
(0.064)
church reasons welcoming members 0.009
(0.040)
insurance enrollment x
church reasons welcoming members
0.012
(0.055)
church reasons interesting congregation 0.032
(0.058)
insurance enrollment x
church reasons interesting congregation
−0.005
(0.070)
constant 0.578∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.078) (0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.082) (0.080)
N 503 504 504 503 504 504 504
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates and are
clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church
(columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day
of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019.
Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying
multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because
a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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Table 40: Use Church Network: keep versus thanks
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
insurance enrollment −0.062∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.046 −0.033 −0.053∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.058∗∗
(0.032) (0.026) (0.032) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.025)






help financial church community −0.002
(0.047)
insurance enrollment x
help financial church community
0.022
(0.059)












makes friends in church −0.056
(0.038)
insurance enrollment x
makes friends in church
0.008
(0.062)
church reasons welcoming members −0.051
(0.046)
insurance enrollment x
church reasons welcoming members
0.073
(0.052)
church reasons interesting congregation 0.002
(0.057)
insurance enrollment x
church reasons interesting congregation
0.041
(0.068)
constant 0.560∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.081) (0.086) (0.084)
N 503 504 504 503 504 504 504
Individual controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Church dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Tobit regressions censored at 0 and 1. Standard errors are in parentheses below the estimates and are
clustered at the session level. Dependent variable is the fraction of the endowment that a participant allocated to either their own church
(columns 1 and 2), a nonprofit charity working with street children (columns 3 and 4) or a country-wide prayer event called the national day
of thanksgiving (columns 5 and 6). The endowment in Wave 1 was 11 GHS in 2015 and the endowment in Wave 2 was 19 GHS in 2019.
Individual controls include age, gender ethnicity, employment, log(income), an indicator for daily church attendance, an indicator for praying
multiple times per day, church fixed effects, and a dummy for the experimental wave. The size of the sample changes across columns because
a computer error led to some missing demographic variables in wave 1.
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10 Appendix D: Model details
10.1 Setup
We assume that a church member has an income of Y and chooses to give an amount g to the
church. The church member enjoys utility u(.) from consuming secular goods, and utility θf(.) from
consuming church goods. Thus a church member who gives g to the church enjoys a total utility of
u(Y − g) + θf(g). Both utility functions are concave, thrice differentiable, and increasing in their
arguments. In each period church members face a probability π of an income loss of size D.
Under the assumption that insurance is offered through the church community, church giving also
has the impact of reducing the size of the loss, thus the total loss would be D − l(g). The function
l(g) is assumed to be increasing and concave. Under the assumption that church members believe in
spiritual insurance, this probability is decomposed into a basic probability of loss π̃, and a portion
of the loss that can be mitigated by giving money to spiritual goods. Therefore, the total subjective
probability of giving is π = π̃ − p(g). The function p(g) is assumed to be increasing and concave.
10.2 Optimal giving to the church in the absence of any insurance
In this section we assume that church members choose a particular level of giving to maximise their
total expected utility. There is no insurance offered through the church.
max
g
(1− π)u(Y − g) + πu(Y − g −D) + θf(g) (7)
This leads to the following first order condition:
(π − 1)u′(Y − g)− πu′(Y − g −D) + θf ′(g) = 0 (8)
The second order condition is satisfied:
(1− π)u′′(Y − g) + πu′′(Y − g −D) + θf ′′(g) < 0
To determine how optimal giving varies with D the size of the loss, we rewrite the FOC in terms
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of g∗(D, θ),
(π − 1)u′(Y − g∗(D, θ))− πu′(Y − g∗(D, θ)−D) + θf ′(g∗(D, θ)) = 0 (9)
This equation implicitly defines the optimal giving g∗, which is a function of the expected loss D
and θ.
We want to know the impact of experimentally manipulating D on the level of giving of individu-













D(D, θ) ∗ [π[u′′(Y − g∗ −D)− u′′(Y − g∗)] + u′′(Y − g∗) + θf ′′(g∗)] = −πu′′(Y − g∗ −D) (10)
The right-hand side of the expression is positive. Each individual term of the expression multiplied
by g∗
′
D is negative. Therefore g
∗′
D must also be negative.





. We can also show that g∗
′
θ is positive: a positive shock on the utility
from consuming church goods increases church donations. Taking the derivative of the FOC with
respect to θ leads to the following equality:
g∗
′
θ (D, θ) ∗ [(1− π)u′′(Y − g∗) + πu′′(Y − g∗ −D) + θf ′′(g∗)] = −f ′(g∗) (11)
The right-hand side of the expression is negative. Each individual term of the expression multiplied
by g∗
′
θ is negative. Therefore g
∗′
θ is positive.
10.3 Community insurance: optimal giving when giving reduces the size
of a loss
In this section we assume that giving to church reduces the size of the loss. L = D − l(g) This




(1− π)u(Y − g) + πu(Y − g −D + l(g)) + θf(g) (12)
This leads to the following first order condition:
(π − 1)u′(Y − g) + π(−1 + l′(g))u′(Y − g −D + l(g)) + θf ′(g) = 0 (13)
The secod order condition is satisfied:
(1− π)u′′(Y − g) + πl′′(g)u′(Y − g −D + l(g)) + π(l′(g)− 1)2u′′(Y − g −D + l(g)) + θf ′′(g) < 0
Rewriting the FOC in terms of g∗(D, θ):
(π − 1)u′(Y − g∗(D, θ))) + π(−1 + l′(g∗(D, θ)))u′(Y − g∗(D, θ)−D + l(g∗(D, θ)))
+ θf ′(g∗(D, θ))) = 0 (14)
Taking the derivative of the FOC with respect to D leads to the following equality:
g∗
′
D ∗ [(1− π)u′′(Y − g∗) + π(l′(g∗)− 1)2u′′(Y − g∗ −D + l(g∗))
+ πl′′(g∗)u′(Y − g −D + l(g∗)) + θf ′′(g∗)] = π(l′(g∗)− 1)u′′(Y − g∗ −D + l(g)) (15)
On the right-hand side u′′(Y − g∗ −D + l(g)) is always negative while the expression multiplied
by g∗
′
D of the left-hand side is also always negative. Therefore the sign of g
∗′
D depends on (l
′(g∗)− 1).




D > 0 when l




D ≤ 0 when l′(g∗) ≤ 1, or g∗ ≥ l′−1(1) (17)
These conditions tell us that for low levels of optimal giving, experimentally increasing the per-
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ceived loss D will decrease optimal giving.
We show below that the variation in optimal giving g∗ can be the result of a variation in θ. More
particularly, we demonstrate that g∗
′
θ > 0. Taking the derivative of the FOC with respect to θ gives:
g∗
′
θ ∗ [(1− π)u′′(Y − g∗) + πl′′(g∗)u′(Y − g∗ −D + l(g∗))
+ π(−1 + l′(g∗))2u′′(Y − g∗ −D + l(g∗)) + θf ′′(g∗)] = −f ′(g∗) (18)
The right-hand side of the expression is negative. Each individual term of the expression multiplied
by g∗
′
θ is negative. Therefore g
∗′
θ is positive.
Therefore our model predicts that there exist a threshold level for θ that will trigger a switch in
the sign of g∗
′
D .
Numerical illustration Graphs 4 and 5 illustrate a numerical example, in which we simulate the
case of g
′∗
D(D, θ) changing sign around the threshold θ̃.
This example uses a CARA utility function (u(c) = 1 − exp(−ac)), and assumes that l(g) =
s log(1 + g). The parameters D, s are chosen such that D− l(g) ≥ 0. Figure 4 shows that the optimal
giving g∗(D, θ) is increasing in θ while Figure 5 indicates that g∗(D, θ) is an increasing function of D
until the threshold θ̃ = 0.345.
10.4 Spiritual insurance: optimal giving when giving reduces the subjec-
tive probability of a loss
In this section we assume that giving reduces the size of the loss. π = π̃ − p(g) This assumption
illustrates the channel of spiritual insurance.
max
g
(1− π̃ + p(g))u(Y − g) + (π̃ − p(g))u(Y − g −D) + θf(g) (19)
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Figure 4: Community insurance - Numerical example: Y = 10, D = 8, π = 0.4, u(.) CARA with
a = 0.1, f(.) CARA with a = 1, and l(.) a logarithmic function with s = 3.5
Figure 5: Community insurance - g∗
′
(D) as a function of θ - numerical example marking the threshold
θ̃ where the sign of g∗
′
(D) changes from positive to negative
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This leads to the following first order condition:
p′(g)u(Y −g)−(1−π̃+p(g))u′(Y −g)−p′(g)u(Y −g−D)−(π̃−p(g))u′(Y −g−D)+θf ′(g) = 0− (20)
Taking the second derivative of the objective function leads to:
p′′(g)(u(Y − g)− u(Y − g −D)) + 2p′(g)(u′(Y − g −D)− u′(Y − g))+
(1− π̃ + p(g))u′′(Y − g) + (π̃ − p(g))u′′(Y − g −D) + θf ′′(g) (21)
The first, third, fourth, and fifth terms are negative. The second term is positive. Intuitively, this
expression is negative and the SOC is satisfied if the effect of the loss on the marginal utility of income
not be too large. In other words, the income effect of the loss on the demand for insurance should not
outweigh the substitution effect.
This condition is not too demanding. For example, it is satisfied in the numerical simulation shown
below, where u is a CARA utility function: u(c) = 1− e−ac. Indeed, in this case,
p′′(g)(u(Y − g)− u(Y − g −D)) + 2p′(g)(u′(Y − g −D)− u′(Y − g))+
(1− π̃ + p(g))u′′(Y − g) + (π̃ − p(g))u′′(Y − g −D) + θf ′′(g)
= [p′′(g) + 2ap′(g))− a2(π̃ − p(g))](e(−a(Y−g−D)) − e(−a(Y−g)))− a2e(−a(Y−g)) + θf ′′(g) (22)
A sufficient condition for this expression to be negative is thus given by
p′′(g) + 2ap′(g)− a2(π̃ − p(g)) ≤ 0




a2(1+g)2 + log(1 + g)
This condition holds for example in the simulation below, where Y = 10, D = 8, π̃ = 0.4, a = 0.1 and
k = 0.09.
In order to determine how optimal giving varies with D the size of the loss, we rewrite the FOC
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in terms of g∗(D, θ),
p′(g∗(D, θ))u(Y − g∗(D, θ))− (1− π̃ + p(g∗(D, θ)))u′(Y − g∗(D, θ))−
p′(g∗(D, θ))u(Y − g∗(D, θ)−D)− (π̃ − p(g∗(D, θ)))u′(Y − g∗(D, θ)−D) + θf ′(g∗(D, θ)) = 0 (23)
Taking the derivative of the FOC with respect to D leads to the following equality:
g∗
′
D ∗ [p′′(g∗)[u(Y − g∗)− u(Y − g∗ −D)] + 2p′(g∗)[u′(Y − g∗ −D)− u′(Y − g∗)]
+ (π̃ − p(g∗))[u′′(Y − g∗ −D)− u′′(Y − g∗)] + u′′(Y − g∗) + f ′′(g)]
= −[p′(g∗)u′(Y − g ∗ −D) + (π̃ − p(g))u′′(Y − g∗ −D)] (24)
Therefore, we have the following conditions:
g∗
′
D > 0 when − [p′(g∗)u′(Y − g ∗ −D) + (π̃ − p(g))u′′(Y − g∗ −D)] < 0 (25)
g∗
′
D < 0 when − [p′(g∗)u′(Y − g ∗ −D) + (π̃ − p(g))u′′(Y − g∗ −D)] > 0 (26)
Numerical illustration We simplify these conditions using a CARA utility function: u(c) =




− p′(g)− (π − p(g))u
′′(Y − g −D)
u′(Y − g −D)




D > 0 when − p′(g∗) + (π̃ − p(g∗))a < 0 (28)
g∗
′
D < 0 when − p′(g∗) + (π̃ − p(g∗))a > 0 (29)
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which can be rewritten as:
g∗
′
D > 0 when
1
a
p′(g∗) > (π̃ − p(g∗)) (30)
g∗
′
D < 0 when
1
a
p′(g∗) < (π̃ − p(g∗)) (31)
Therefore, we find that g∗
′
D is positive when the effectiveness of the spiritual insurance divided by
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion at g∗ is greater than the level of risk at g∗.
We can now also derive the conditions under which g∗
′
D is increasing until a certain level, and then
decreasing. For this, we use the following reformulation of conditions (32) and (33):
g∗
′
D > 0 when p
′(g∗) + ap(g∗) > aπ̃ (32)
g∗
′
D < 0 when p
′(g∗) + ap(g∗) < aπ̃ (33)
Let us define Γ(g) = p′(g) + ap(g). For g∗
′




D > 0 when g
∗ < Γ−1(aπ) (34)
g∗
′
D < 0 when g
∗ > Γ−1(aπ) (35)
In order for Γ′ to be decreasing, we need the following condition to be true:
Γ′(g) ≤ 0⇔ p′′(g) + ap′(g) ≤ 0 (36)
In the following, we will use a parametrization of p(g) that is concave, and an a such that condi-
tion (36) hold in order to illustrate that with an increase in the level of giving, due to a higher θ for
example, the sign of g∗
′
D can reverse.
We know that g∗ is a function of θ, and we will now show a numerical example that illustrates
the possibility of g∗
′
D |g∗(θ) to be positive until g∗(θ̃) and negative afterwards. We will use the a simple
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logarithmic function p(g) = klog(g + 1) where π̃ and k are such that 0 < π̃ − p(g) < 1. If we insert
this into equation (32), we get:
− k
g∗(θ) + 1
+ (π̃ − klog(g∗(θ) + 1))a < 0 (37)
Together with (33), we know that at a specific θ̃, this equation is equal to zero:
− k
g∗(θ̃) + 1
+ (π̃ − klog(g∗(θ̃) + 1))a = 0 (38)
The following graphs illustrate a numerical example, in which we simulate the case of g∗(θ) being
around the threshold in (38).
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Figure 6: Numerical example: Y = 10, D = 8, π = 0.4, u(.) CARA with a = 0.1, f(.) CARA with
a = 1, and p(.) a logarithmic function with k = 0.09
Figure 7: g∗
′
(D) as a function of θ - numerical example marking the threshold θ̃ where the sign of
g∗
′
(D) changes from positive to negative
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11 Appendix E: Material
11.1 Questionnaire
1. How old are you?
– number between 18 and 75
2. What is your gender?
– Male
– Female
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
3. Where were you born?
– Accra
– Rural Ghana
– Urban Ghana (not Accra)
– Outside Ghana in Africa
– Outside Africa
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
4. How long have you lived in Accra?
– Whole life
– More than 10 years
– 5 – 10 years
– 2-5 years
– Less than 2 years
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
5. Are you married?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable










– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
7. As an adult, have you ever left Ghana for more
than 3 months for work or study?
– Yes
– Where did you go?
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
8. What is your current work status?
– Student





– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable






– Manufacturing or construction
– Not-for-profit
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable







– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
11. How many people live in your household?
– number
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable





– Other senior relative
– Joint decisions incl. me
– Joint decisions not incl. me
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
13. How much do you earn on average per month
in Ghana cedis?
– Less than 200






– More than 8000
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
14. How much does your household earn on average
per month in Ghana cedis?
– Less than 200






– More than 8000
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
15. Are you responsible for the daily financial needs
(not including any salary payments) of any of





– Other community member
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
16. How many people in each of the categories are
you financially responsible for?
17. Which of the following expenses in you and
your dependents’ lives do you face on a regu-
lar monthly basis?
– Food
– Sickness(including medication costs, etc.)
– Transport
– Insurance
– Helping needy family members
– Church contribution
– Other social contribution (e.g. pledge to a
school or charity)
– Investment in own business
– Investment in friend, relative, or business
partner’s business
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
18. How much do you spend each month in cedis
on the particular expenses?
19. In the last year, was there a substantial, unex-
pected increase in any of these aspects of you
and your dependant’s lives?
– Food
– Sickness(including medication costs, etc.)
– Transport
– Insurance
– Helping needy family members
– Church contribution
– Other social contribution (e.g. pledge to a
school or charity)
– Investment in own business
– Investment in friend, relative, or business
partner’s business
– I faced no unexpected expenses
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– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
20. How much did you spend to address the sub-
stantial increase?
21. What is your principal daily means of trans-
port?
– Privately owned car






– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
22. How many cellphones do you own?
– number
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
23. How many hours a week do you spend browsing
the internet?
– Less than 30 minutes
– 30 minutes to 2 hours
– 2 to 5 hours
– 5-10 hours
– More than 10 hours
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
24. Do you own a business?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
25. How many years have you owned your business?
– Less than 1 year
– 1 – 3 years
– 3 – 10 years
– More than 10 years
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
26. How many employees do you have?
– number
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
27. Which religion do you belong to?






– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
28. Were you born into this religion?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
29. Which denomination do you belong to? (Please
specify a particular denomination, e.g. Action
Chapel, ICGC, etc.)
– name
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
30. Do you belong to a different denomination than
5 years ago?
– No
– Yes,I changed within the last 5 years
– Yes, I changed more than 5 years ago
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
31. What are the main reasons you are with your
current church?
– The teaching about God corresponds to
what I believe in
– I go for the moral guidance to me and my
family
– I like the atmosphere of the services
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– Friends or relatives brought me there
– Other members made an effort to welcome
me
– The congregation contains many interest-
ing and successful people
– I hope to meet a good marriage partner
for me or my children
– The building is close to my home
– The facilities are comfortable (e.g. aircon-
ditioning, comfortable seating, etc.)
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
32. Are you engaged in any of the following min-
istries of your church?




– Men or women’s ministry
– Youth ministry
– Outreach
– Deacon or deaconess
– Protocol
– Pastoring
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
33. How many hours a week do you spend on each
ministry? (preparation, participation, etc.)
34. Have you received financial assistance from




– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
35. How many times per week or per year do you
attend your church?
– Less than once a year
– A few times per year
– A few times per month
– Weekly
– More than once per week
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
36. On average, how many hours do you spend each
time you visit your church? (e.g duration of a
service, prayer meeting, etc.)
– Less than 1 hour
– 1-2 hours
– 2-3 hours
– More than 3 hours
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
37. How many hours do you travel (going and com-
ing) to attend your regular church?
– Less than 30minutes
– 30minutes – 1 hour
– More than 1 hour
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
38. Have you moved your place of residence in order
to be closer to your church?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
39. In the last 6 weeks, have you engaged in any of
the following activities to bring others to your
church?
– Preaching or teaching in the church
– Preaching or teaching outside the church
– Inviting friends or family to church
– Distributing church material in public
– Speaking or writing in public media (news-
papers, radio, television, etc.)
– Prayer
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
40. How often do you pray to God?
– Multiple times per day
– Once per day
– A few times per week
– Occasionally
– prefer not to answer
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– do not know
– not applicable




– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
42. Do you drink alcohol?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
43. Is this decision for religious reasons?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
44. Do you smoke tobacco?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
45. Is this decision for religious reasons?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable




– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
47. Which of the following ceremonies have you






– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
48. What was the main cause of the most recent





– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable




– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
50. How much on average do you give to the church
per month?
– Less than 5 cedis
– 5 – 10 cedis
– 11 – 50 cedis
– 51 – 100 cedis
– 101 – 200cedis
– 201-500 cedis
– More than 501 cedis
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
51. Does giving to charity serve the same spiritual
duty as giving directly to the church?
– No, charity is more important
– No, charity is less important
– Yes, they are equally important
– I do not think I have a duty to either.
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
52. How is God involved in your finances?
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– God leaves me to run my own financial af-
fairs
– God provides enough that I do not suffer
– God blesses me with financial abundance
– God is not interested in my finances
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
53. Is it important for you that your close friends
come from the same church as you?
– Yes, I try to only make friends with people
from my church or mosque
– Yes, I try to seek people from my church
or mosque but it is not so important
– No, it is not important at all
– No, I prefer not to be friends with people
from my church or mosque
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
54. Is it important for you that your coworkers
come from the same church as you?
– Yes, I only work with people from my
church or mosque
– Yes, I try to seek people from my church
or mosque but it is not so important
– No, it is not important at all
– No, I prefer not to work with people from
my church or mosque
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
55. Do you try to do business with people from the
same church as you?
– Yes, I only work with people from my
church
– Yes, I try to seek people from my church
but it is not so important
– No, it is not important at all
– No, I prefer not to work with people from
my church or mosque
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
56. Who do you call when you need counselling
about personal or family issues?
– No one








– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
57. Who do you go to when you need financial help?
– No one





– Informal financial services (e.g susu group,
moneylenders)
– Work superior
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable












– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
59. Within the last 2 years, have you ever attended
a prayer camp either for yourself or on behalf
of a friend or family member?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
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60. Which other clubs or associations are you an
active member of?
– name
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
61. How did you meet your spouse if you are mar-
ried? Where is the most likely place you will






– Other social gathering
– Internet
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
62. Generally speaking, would you say other
Ghanaians can be trusted?
– People can almost always be trusted
– People can usually be trusted
– You usually cannot be too careful dealing
with people
– You always cannot be too careful dealing
with people
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
63. How much of the time do you trust the Ghana-
ian government?
– I always trust the government
– I mostly trust the government
– I mostly mistrust the government
– I always mistrust the government
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable




– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
65. Why not?
66. Do you hold any other sorts of insurance?
– Yes
– No
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
67. Please specify which ones
– name
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR MARKET
MEMBERS




– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
69. How many years have you belonged to the as-
sociation?
– number
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
70. How many years have you paid your market
dues?
– number
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
71. Have you ever met Auntie Eva, the market sec-
retary?
– Yes
– No, but I know who she is
– No, I have no idea who she is
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
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72. Have you ever received financial help from
the market (loan, emergency money, help with
stock, etc.)?
– Yes, from the head of the market line
– Yes, from the Kaneshie Market Associa-
tion
– Yes, from any other market members
– No, I have received no help from the mar-
ket
– prefer not to answer
– do not know
– not applicable
73. Which market line do you belong to?
– name
– prefer not to answer




Before participants arrive, enumerators prepare the room: they install chairs, tables, computers, and
dividers. The session monitor prepares desks numbers to be given to participants, receipts, insurance
forms, and envelopes for random draw. Enumerators sit and start the program while waiting for the
participants.
When participants arrive, they are given an ID number and sit in front of a computer. The
session monitor welcomes them and explains the experiment in English. One enumerator translates
the explanations in the local language spoken by the participants (most often Twi).
Session monitor: “Welcome to our study, thank you for coming. We are a group of researcher from
Toulouse in France and we are doing a study here in Ghana in collaboration with Central University
College. The first part of the study consists in a questionnaire that contains demographic questions as
well as questions about your religious practices. For completing the survey, you will receive 20GHS.The
questionnaire is anonymous, no one will be able to associate you with the questionnaire. We will not
record any private information with your answers. You are allowed to skip any question you do not
want to answer. If you choose to stop the interview we will give you 5GHS for your effort to come
here. In a second part, you will play a game on how to allocate 11GHS. You will be asked 10 questions;
in each question you can choose you to allocate money between two different recipients. The list of
the different recipients is written on the white board. First, in some occasions, you will have the
opportunity to keep money for yourself. Another option will be to give money to the Street’s Children
Fund. This is an NGO active in Jamestown that helps children from the streets to access education.
You will also be allowed to give to the National Thanksgiving Association, for a National Week of
Prayer gathering as many Ghanaians as possible, from different religions, to pray for Ghana. This
year the Week of prayer is expected to be held in March. You will also have the chance to make some
donation to your own church privately, and in another option you can offer money to your church
with your name. At the end of the game, we will pick one question randomly with equal probabilities.
We will make payments according to your answers to this question. First, you will play a practice
round, helped by your enumerator. You will play the real round privately. The session monitor is here
to help you at any time. There are different types of sessions. The session we run with you is picked
at random. We now ask you if you agree with us using the data from this session - the answers you
give in the questionnaire and in the game which are anonymous - for research purpose.”
PAUSE, wait for objections. Continue if there are no objections. One participant draws an
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envelope that contains the type of the session: ‘INSURANCE’, ‘INSURANCE INFORMATION’, or
‘NO INSURANCE’.
If the session is ‘INSURANCE’:
Session monitor: “The type of session we run with you is called ‘INSURANCE’. This means
that we will offer you a funeral insurance policy. This insurance scheme is offered on the market by
Enterprise Life and we will purchase it for you. From the day we enroll your name and for one year,
if you or one of your family members (to be designated) dies, a recipient will get money to finance
the funeral expenses (1000GHS). You can choose to enroll with you one family member. It can be of
your parents, one of your minor children, your wife or husband. They should be younger than 74.
To cover you and a family member, this insurance costs annually 12.50GHS. This group insurance is
coordinated by your church. The coordinator is your Pastor (name). At the end of the year, you can
collectively decide to continue or not the insurance contract. Any claim should be addressed to your
Pastor, he will receive money for you if anything happens. If you do not wish to be benefit from the
insurance policy, please inform us. “
If the session is ‘INSURANCE INFORMATION’:
Monitor: “The type of session we run with you is called ‘INSURANCE’. This means that we will
give you information about an insurance that you can decide to purchase for yourself. The insurance
we would like to discuss with you is a funeral insurance offered by Enterprise Life: if you or one of
your family members (to be designated) dies, a recipient will get money to finance the funeral expenses
(1000GHS). You can choose to enroll with you one of your parents, one of your minor children, or
your wife or husband. They should be younger than 74. To cover you and one family member, this
insurance costs annually 12.50GHS. At the end of the year, you can collectively decide to continue or
not the insurance contract. The coordinator for this group insurance could be your Pastor (name).
Any claim would be addressed to him, he would receive money for you if anything happens. If you are
interested in buying this insurance, please contact Pastor (name).”
For all the sessions:
Monitor: “The experiment is now about to start. Please remember that the answers that you will
give will be anonymous and be kept secret. The enumerators are here to guide you through the survey
and translate it if necessary. You can leave the experiment at any time and you will be paid a show-up
fee of 5GHS.”
The participants answer the questionnaire with the help of enumerators. After answering the
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questionnaire, participants in ‘INSURANCE’ sessions fill in the insurance form. Then they proceed
to the game, first a practice round helped by the enumerators, and then the real round by themselves.
Once they have entered their choices for the 10 money allocation questions, the participants randomly
pick a letter that corresponds to one question. The session monitor enters the letter in the computer
to record total payment. Participants leave the room and wait to be called for payment.
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